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THE THEORY OF EXPERIENCE IN RELIGIOUS REALISM,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
MORAL AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.
INTRODUCTION.
This thesis falls within the field of realistic
type of modern thought in its most recent development. This
is critical realism with a positive religious tendency, a
contemporary philosophical interest in morality and religion
given the terminology of "religious realism". The problem
is to determine the place of moral experience in the thought
of religious realists. (1)
The method of approach to this problem is to invest-
igate the important writings of some representative thinkers
in the field, and to systematize their interpretations of
experience with special reference to their bearing in moral-
ity and religion. The procedure will take the following
course:
1. To endeavor to understand experience in the
light of religious realistic view of the world as a whole.
2. To determine the nature of consciousness in the
light of this world view, with reference to moral experience.
3. To interpret their view of moral experience in
the light of their epistemology
,
bearing on the problem of
knowledge and truth.
(1) This the^sis was inspired by the reading of the book
entitled Religious Realism , a cooperative work edited by
.
D.C.Macintosh. Among the writers in this volume studied
for this thesis are: J.E.Boodin, W.P.Montague, J.B.Pratt,
A.K.Rogers, H.N.Wieman, W.K.Wright and the editor.

24. To determine what constitutes character in the
light of their ethical principles.
5. To determine the place of religion in moral
experience.
Religious realism endeavors to understand and inter-
pret reality in general and religion in particular by way of
an empirical and pragmatic approach or in the words of William
James "radical empiricism". In other words, experience is
the key to the objectivity, reality and existence of God as
the embodiment of the supreme values of life in the universe.
D. C. Macintosh as one of the leading representatives of this
type of thought characterizes it thus:
Religious Realism means centrally the
view that a religious Object, such as may appropri-
ately be called God, exists independently of our
consciousness thereof, and is yet related to us in
such a way that through reflection on experience
in general and religious experience in particular
it is possible for us to gain either adequate-
ly verified knowledge or a practically valuable
and theoretically permissible faith not only that
that religious Object exists but also, within what-
ever limits, as to what its nature is. (1)
To express It in a less theological phraseology, he declares:
In religious epistemology my fundamental
theslfc would be that in religious experience at
Its best there is a revelation (discovery) of a
dependable reality, divine in quality and function,
which promotes the good will in man on condition
of his maintainance of the right adjustment.... (2)
The theory of religious realism presupposes a real
universe of things, values and persona, finite and divine;
and it interprets life and human experience as essentially a
process of adjustment to the real world. The foqfeatlon or
(1) D.C.Macintosh; RR, v (preface)
(2) CAT, 306.
Note: See bibliography for references to texts as symbolized
here, and this applies to all subsequent footnotes.

3spring of such adjustment Is found in human nature. This
view expresses the faith in the close relationship "between
humanity and the real universe; the intimate interaction be-
tween God and man in the realization of moral and religious
values through personal and cosmic experience. It Justifies
the belief in and the reality of the moral Ideal. God is,
in his highest perfection, revealed in the "concrete realities
of experience" . It asserts that God is the creative "Spirit','
the principle of "Interaction", or the highest possibility of
value which is accessible to man whenever he turns to him in
"ri&ht adjustment"; that God reveals himself as the "uplifting
spiritual power" in human life, realizing personal values and
purposes; and that God is the "providential controller" of
the world and the "conservator" of spiritual values. Religious
realism, in short, believes in the immanence of objective
reality, the "divine Life and Spirit", in human experience;
and the presence of that reality in the human soul varies in
degree according to the relative attainment of personality or
individual adjustment to social and cosmic life. (1)
D.G.Macintosh; RC, 186, 235-6.

4CHAPTER I.
EXPERIENCE, REALITY AND EXISTENCE.
fo follow the method expressed in the Introduction
let us now procede to consider the religious realistic view
of the world as a whole, as presented in experience. This
leads us to the discovery of four varying interpretations:
1. The teleological integration between man and
the universe in the thought of A. K. Rogers.
2. The dualistlc character of the universe and its
processes
—
psychical and physical—as implied in the thoughts
of W. P. Montague and J. B. Pratt.
3. The conception of "the "Five Attributes of Real-
ity" by Boodin.
4. The triadic realism of D. C. Macintosh.
A. The Teleological Integration Between Man and Universe.
Experience according to religious realism involves
certain fundamental presuppositions. One of these is the
o-f rKe
purposive nature 'world and its cosmic processes. Man and
nature both have a teleological function in relation to the
world as a whole. "Man's attempt to progressively come to
a knowledge of the nature of the real world in which he finds
himself, and of which he is a part", writes A. K. Rogers,
"is at the same time a revelation of man himself." That is
to say, the very nature and purpose of the world is so consti-
tuted as to make it possible for man to find his place and
i
•
5and develop his character to the full extent of his natural
and organic possibilities. "It is the gradual freeing of
himself", he goes on to say, "from a power which is strange
and foreign, to him, through the recognition that his own
life is bound up with this supposed external reality, and
that only by accepting it and putting himself in line with
the forces that it represents, can he attain a freedom and
self-realization that is substantial and real". (1)
In so far^then^s man is truly free he knows the
truth; and in so far as he has a. real insight into truth he
is free. This requires viewing alternately the facts of
empirical situations and the world in its metaphysical struc-
ture which to a great extent controls the facts of moral
life both individual and social.
B. The Duality of the World as Implied in Experience.
A slightly different interpretation from that of
A. K. Rogers, but which implies the same purposive nature of
the world and the integrative relationship between man and
the universe, is presented by W. P. Montague and J. B. Pratt.
They recognize the duallstic structure of reality. It is
psychical in one aspect, and physical in another aspect.
The most perplexing and perhaos the most central
philosophical problem, declares W. P. Montague, is the nro-
blem of the nature of consciousness and manner of its re-
lation to the world which it reveals, but in which it also
abides. He also recognizes that between the consciousness
(1) A.K.Rogers; SHP, 5dl.

6of an object or of a quality, and the neural processes which
precede and perhaps accompany that consciousness there
is a difference far transcending all differences of quality,
magnitude, time, and place with which physics is conversant.
(1) This implies the duality of reality as it is presented
in experience or in human consciousness. Indeed, human ex-
perience, according J. B. Pratt's critical realistic dualism,
recognizes two kinds of existence, the physical and the men-
tal or psychical life. And yet somehow, Pratt wonders, they
are brought into more or less close or intimate relationship
with each other, either in dualistlc parallelism or in process
of interaction. (2)
C. The Five Attributes of Reality: Realistic Universe.
The teleological nature of life and existence and
the dualistlc character or reality raises the problem, "How
shall we think of reality as a whole?" Or, how does religious
realism explain or interpret the structure of the universe?
J. E. Boodin has written a book entitled A Realistic
Universe in which he has attempted to offer a solution to
this problem. The book sets forth a realistic interpretation
of the world as presented in experience. In the spirit of
religio-philosoohical contemplation Boodin sees reality as a
whole in a mystico-poetlcal oerspective in terms of "The
Divine Five-Fold Truth." This means that reality reveals
itself in five aspects or under five categories of existence;
namely, being, time, space, form, and consciousness. (3)
(1) W.P.Montague; E-WJ, 105.
(2) J
.B.Pratt; MS, 7.
(3) J. E. Boodin; Ru, 3-H.

7Let us consider these attributes separately and try
to discover what Boodln means by them.
1. Reality as Being: To say that reality is being
Indicates that the world is not a static sort of reality, but
an eternal process, a "constellation of energy , conscious and
unconscious, interlocking and Interacting in space" governed
by specific laws, both natural or mechanical and rational or
conscious. The physical universe is in process of infinite
stages of "transmutations", and through the dynamic centers
or energy, both In the natural and in the personal senses
reality hangs together as a whole. "No blind wall separates
experience from the world of its interests and love; though
thoughts and things are part of the one divine context". (1)
Mind, by virtue of its Immediacy in experience, is fundamental-
it
ly the most real of all being and which is revealed in the
leleological or purposive history of the universe. This is
the implication of "Cosmic Evolution". "In a large and pro-
found sense we must conceive mind as part of nature. Mind
is not indifferent to nature nor nature to mind". (2) Mind
is indeed the fundamental presuoposition of the world of be-
ing, finite or cosmic being. It is through thoughts that we
can use things and things become significant with meanings
and values by entering into the contest of human and divine
thought, or into relationship within one dynamic living mind-
ed organism of the cosmos. Thus the universe is a living
process, and reality as being Is in the making.
(1) Op.clt., 4.
(2) J. E. Boodln; CE, 260-272.

82. Reality as Time: The activistic and energetic
nature of being involves the reality of time through which
processes, or the drama of human and cosmic experience, be-
come significant with temporal relations, as past, present
and future events. The various changing complexities of the
world are held together in the unity of time which gives
events their meanings and survival values in the process of
evolution. Changes would not become but for the reality of
time as the underlying thread that strings and weaves to-
gether the streams of organic and personal experiences. The
intrinsic values of life would not be realized but for the
essence or subsistence of time. "Time is the precondition
of the consciousness of before and after, as space is the
slde-by-side. • . .Upon this consciousness of before and after
we build our artificial framework of chronological systems,
infinitely outstripping tae brief immediate span of a few sec-
onds but none the less deriving their content from it". (1)
This is the pragmatic nature of time. Contexts of experience
or events come and go, their meanings shift and grow, but
time brings these temporal streams of events into the compre-
hensive unity of the eternal. (2) "The theory of relativity,
it is clear, will have to be adapted to the empirical facts.
...Time is of the essence of reality, and no theory of real-
ity can stand which fails to recognize its temporal aspect.
And whece there is time and change there is relativity". (3)
3. Reality as Space: Space is not a nonexistent
(1) J.E.Boodin; RU, 5-6.
(2> Ibid, Chap. XIV, 251-262.
(3) CE, 323.
£4t*xxxxxR5f
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9"void". On the contrary, reality as a whole presupposes the
existence of space as fundamental. "So long as distance
thwarts the will's realization in the hand clasp of loyal men,
the meeting of fond lips, and the embrace of loving hearts,
space must be recognized as real". (1) Space is real in the
sense that it is as time a condition of relation, the relation
of things and energies, the stage of interplay or interaction
of energies and the field of personal experience. Modern
science has accepted soace as one of the three attributes or
"independent variable", time and energy being the other two.
All things float and have thetr relations in space. Without
space there would be no field for the expression of finite
and cosmic experiential creativity. "The conception of cos-
mic space is fundamental in the theory of relativity and in
any cosmic philosophy. Space is the universal medium in which
the interaction of energies is staged. Without space we can
have no metric conceptions such as distance, size and shape.
Einstein is right that space is not a nonentity. It has
physical reality". (2)
4. Reality as Form: Throughout the complex chang-
ing flux of the universe there is an eternal structural form
or pattern; and "in the shifting and relative shapes of the
flux, the soul comes to the Insight, now and then, of eternal
beauty". (3) Fitness, order, Tightness, beauty, and goodness
are the intrinsic forms that human and divine experience seeks
to unravel and realize. Real form is the eternal structure
(1) J.E.Boodin; RU, 6-7; 207-250.
(2) CE, 332.
(3) RU, 9-10; 307-384.
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of divine essence, "Beauty is but nature become conscious of
its formal character through its more developed organs of hu-
man nature nature and human nature conspire to produce the
sunset and the symphony nature discovers its own order in
the rhythmic pulse beats of her complex and restless life
constantly transformed into growing experience of man and
universal mind". (1) As reality is in the making, it pos-
sesses within itself the pattern, or constitutive ideals in
a complete dynamic, not static, wholeness and perfection.
This divine form is the direction of life processes and
growth, or evolution. Life as it is in the making tends to-
ward life as it ought to be in perfection and supreme value.
5. Reality as Consciousness: If reality is alive
onljr conscious minds can be aware of it; and if life is worth
living only personal consciousness can realize its meaning
and value. The most imoortant aspect of reality, therefore,
is consciousness. "In itself", says Boodin, "consciousness
has no variety, no color, no direction. But with it comes
to light the color, and variety of this whole checkered flow-
ing world". In other words, "consciousness is a neutral
light. It adds only the awareness". (2) This is the prag-
matic function of consciousness, that it makes an effective
causal difference to the world of experience, and things.
The recognition of the reality of consciousness is the wis-
dom of the Eastern mind in its conception of the reality of
the living spirit, the "atma", Buddha or Brahma or the
(1) Op.cit., 10.
(2) Ibid, 8; 115-150.
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Absolute Self in Hindu thought. Nature furnishes the field
of conscious expression or awareness; but it is conscious-
ness that realizes their meanings and values in relation to
spiritual beings, human and divine. The ll^ht of conscious-
ness reveals the glory and splendor of God's world. This in
essence is the religious realistic conception of conscious-
ness and reality as a whole. "It reveals itself to our pur-
posive endeavors as a world of restless energies with their
relative uniformities as time, which in the flux of selves
and things gives the lie to the past and creates for the
soul new mansions of meaning and values space, the play-
ground of energies the whole is lighted by consciousness;
and running through it all there must be form which our
finite minds strive to unravel". (1)
D. The Triadic Realism: Three-fold Realms of Reality.
We have seen how Rogers Interpreted reality as a
teleologlcal process of integration between man and the uni-
verse; Montague and Pratt conceived of it in two related
asoects,!af the physical and the psychical; and then we con-
sidered in more detail Boodin's view of reality in terms of
the five-fold divine attributes. Let us now turn to a still
another form of interpreting the universe by D. C. Macintosh.
Macintosh conceives the universe in a triad of realities. (2)
1. The order of physical realism: This is the re-
cognition of the Physical universe in soace-time relations
as existing independently of all finite minds or consciousness
(1) Op.cit., 11.
(2) D.G.Macintosh; RR, 346.
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and in a sense the objective expression of the divine creat-
ivity, but none the less distinct from the nature and being
of God, and individual persons.
2. The realm of personal realism: This is the as-
sertion of the pluralistic existence of spiritual beings or
individual persons, and the affirmation of the realistic view
that there are as part of reality individual psychical lives
or selves. These psychical beings are the concrete subjects
of consciousness and experience.
3. Religious realism: This embraces the faith
which is reasonable that there is a religious object which
is God who is an existent reality not dependent for his
existence upon man's consciousness or ideas; and the meta-
physical ground of all reality, in some sense immanent in
nature and in personal lives, and in another sense trans-
cendent and objective. God's existence is much more con-
cretely real than the mere ideal or projection of finite
minds
.
This triadic conception of reality is the result
of the attempt of religious realists to create a monistic
metaphysical interpretation which is a. reconstruction of
subjective idealism and objective naturalism. It lncorpor
rates Rogers' teleological interpretation, the dualistic
interactionism of Montague and Pratt, and also it sets forth
in more condensed form the "five-fold divine truth" of
Boodin's "realistic universe". Religious realists are in
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formal agreement with regard to the recognition of three
distinct realms of existent realities; namely, things, per-
sons and God.(l)
E. The Realistic Conception of Subsistence: Essence.
There is another aspect of the realm of existence
which has in anticipation df the problem of truth a great
significance. This is the realistic conception of subsistence
or essence. The realm of essence is the realm of meanings and
values; but essence implies the realm of subsistence. Only
with such presupposition of subsistent existence that certain
aspects of experience and events such as error, dreams, il-
lusions and the iike could be explained, interpreted and their
significance determined. "In its current usage, subsistence
has, to begin with, one meaning to which no exception nedd
be taken. It may refer, that is, to any possible term that
stands for a logical aspect or content of human thinking". (2)
The laws of reason, relations, ethical principles or virtues
and values in their objective conditions do subsist or have
their existence apart from any physical or conscious proces-
ses. Such things as error and hallucinations, for examole,
i have subsistent existence, but without real existence. (3)
W. P. '.'ontague distinguishes four main divisions of
the realm of subsistence as related to experience:
1. Things which have primary intrinsic presence and
efficacy in spatio-temporal existence. This is obvious.
2. Things neither existing nor experienced which
(1) A.K.Rogers; WT, 76-99. J.B.Pratt; MS, 136,139,184-6.
(2) Ibid, 128.
(3$ W.P.Montague; WK, 354-5.
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lack vicarious efficacy. This is absolute negativity or void.
3. Things present in experience but not in existence
Here lie/ error, dream and illusions.
4. Things existing and enjoying primary time-space
efficacy but without vicarious efUE-icaoy ; or reoresentation.
Concents of s^ace, time and values belong in this division.
•
••
•
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CHAPTER II.
EXPERIENCE AND THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: THE SELF.
We have seen In the previous chapter the religious
realistic comprehensive view of reality and existence as pre-
sented in experience; and we have noted the varying inter-
pretations. But we have also noted the formal agreement of
their slightly differing points of viewing the real world
and life as a whole. This agreement lies in their recogni-
tion of the three-fold realms of reality, as set forth by
D. C. Macintosh, namely; the reality of the physical, the
personal and the divine or God. The problem of the present
chapter involves the determination of the nature of that
the
aspect of reality which ls/funda^ental ground of experience
and personality; that is consciousness. This will Involve
also the nature and character of the self.
A. The Chief Types of Thought Regarding Consciousness.
It has been noted that consciousness is an integral
part of the divine truth of reality as a whole; and perhaps
the most important Dart of existence. The fact of conscious-
ness seem to have been in the history of thought the great-
est stumbling block in the interpretation of human life, at
least to traditional naturalism. There are three distinct
types of thought that deal with the nature of consciousness; (1)
1. Subjectivism: Subjective idealism declares that
reality is constituted entirely in terms of ideas or psychic
(1) Brilliant expositions of these tyoes are to
be found in J.B.Pratt, APR, Part I; and in
W.P.Montague, WK, "Postscript"; also in
D.D.Macintosh, PK.
•
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processes, while the things which science calls physical are
mere appearances, the expression or objectification of mind,
both finite and absolute.
2. Objectivism: The objectlvistic school includes
in its fold the naturalistic type of mind; and some of the
thinkers in this school, In more recent years, have formed
the neo-realistic group. They are sometimes known as behav-
viorists. Naturalism denies any real existence to what is
called consciousness; or it is rather that the term has been
misapplied. The term consciousness according to behaviorism,
which is the protege7 of materialism and neo-reallsm, is right-
ly applied to the processes in the physical world taking plac#
within the human brain, and which correspond to the objective
behavior of the human organism. And there is no such thing
as psychic state. The mind is reduced to mechanical terms.
3« The mediating school: Between these two extreme
types of thought regarding consciousness there has emerged a
third or synthetic type which serves to mediate reconciliation
between them. Critical realism and objective idealism both
fall in line with this reconstructive type. Critical realism,
however, places a larger emphasis on nature with regard to its
reality, while objective Idealism tends to minimize the real-
ity of nature; both, nevertheless, agree on the reality and
immateriality of consciousness and on the prime importance of
the spiritual life. They take issue with either traditional
subjective idealism or naturalism; they affirm the denial of
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both; that Is, the reality of consciousness on the one hand
and the reality of nature on the other.
4. Religious realism, it is obvious, accepts the
view of critical realism; or it may be said, critical realism
takes upon itself a religious outlook. "Man and the universe
may be exceedingly unlike;" declares J. B. Pratt, "yet, after
all, man is a product of the universe, and, so far as we know
the latest and most consummate product, and his nature must
therefore be taken into serious consideration by any one who
would seek to determine the nature of the world. .."( 1)
B. Consciousness As A Form of Energy: W. P. Montague.
Consciousness as it has been implied is something
different in kind from the physical. Among religious real-
ists it is interpreted as "a form of energy" , as immediate
"awareness" or condition of meaning and value, as something
"superadded" to the mental content of experience, as a "po-
tential" something with purpose, or as "creative activity"
in human life,
W. P. Montague thinks of consciousness in terms of
his theory of "hylopsychism" or energism. This is the view
that consciousness is the potential energy in the realm of
mind actualized in thought, as the kinetic energy in the
realm of matter actualized in motion; and each type of ener-
gy is distinctly different from the other in kind, but they
do mutually interact in causal efficiency. This is made ex-
plicit in the statement that, "The potentiality of the
(1) J.B.Pratt, in D.C.Macintosh (ed.); RR, 35.
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physical Is the actuality of the psychical and the potential-
ity of the psychical is the actuality of the physical", (1)
This is consistent with the duallstic interactionism of Pratt,
and also compatible with the scientific principle of the con-
servation of energy; for what is lost of the kinetic energy
in organic processes causing mental or psychic potentiality
is equated or balanced in the kinetic energy produced or
caused by mental activity to the physical organism. This
view of consciousness takes full account of the causal re-
lation between the potential and the kinetic energies or be-
tween mind and body; this is on the basis that, as Montague
believes, secondary qualities of objects or sensations exist
in the physical world as the actuality of organic processes
in perception. This is in agreement with Boodin's theory
that sense quality is a purely ohysical fact. (2)
The important and promising character of Montague's
theory is the recognition of the immateriality of conscious-
ness. It makes possible a spiritual interpretation of the
self and personality which is the basic foundation of the
ethics of religious realism. In the human species, Montague
asserts, there are three levels of potentialities; first, the
mechanical process manifest in space-time changes; second,
the vital process manifest in organic and chemical changes
and developing capacities and tendencies for assimilation and
adaptation; and third, the sensory process where specific
qualities emerge out of organic and neural activities, by
(1) W.P.Montague; BU, 75-62; E-WJ, 103-134; in NR,2tf2.
(2) J.E.Boodin; RU, 166.
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which awareness or self-consciousness becomes a fact. At
each indivisible instant of its existence the self possesses
a retrospect of the past, a prospect of the future and a
oersoective view of external presence. This is the tri-dl-
menSlonal aspect of consciousness. (1)
C. Consciousness as a Universal Condition: J.E.Boodin.
The energistic conception of the nature of conscious-
ness has just been considered which took the form of the theo-
ry of hylopsychism in Montague's thought. Boodin explicitly
denies that consciousness can be explained in terms of ener-
getic processes; neither can consciousness be derived from
energy, nor from any potentiality. He believes that it is
an underlying actuality in the nature of reality, while "some
energetic situations are potentially conscious only when
consciousness is added to them". Viewed from the empirical
situations, it is neither the rational aspect of mental pro-
cesses nor the cognitive meaning of perceptions. It is the
"condition for Intuiting" or "lighting up" such meaning with
its inherent relationship; an awareness of relations in the
conatlve system. Consciousness, in other words, is simply
an added fact which is somehow bound up with the subjective
significance of relations, or that which makes an energetic
situation aware of itself. (2)
This view makes consciousness transcendental and
abstract, and sharply distinguished from mind and its mental
processes. 'Boodin thinks that conative processes and also
(1) W.P.Montague; in NR, 262-4.
(2) J.E.Boodin; RU, 119-123; CB, 3^6-401.
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tendencies do exist and operate apart and without conscious-
ness; but these derive their significance and values only
when the fact of consciousness is added to them. Conscious-
ness, therefore, is some kind of precondition for the aware-
ness of meanings and the realization of values. (1) The func-
tion of the psychophysical organism must therefore be depen-
dent for its character and individual status on the under-
lying cosmic consciOHsness of reality. This is the Divine
Consciousness; and each individual self is a divine spark of
the life of God. It is this, obviously in the mind of Boodin,
that gives the moral and spiritual character of man and his
experience. Personality becomes the vessel or the bearer of
intrinsic meanings and values of life only when it acquires
or is endowed with consciousness, that is when the energy of
the personal will becomes conscious.
Consciousness, then, is a universal fact; as such
it is in the nature and being of God. It stands in an analo-
gous condition to the reality of time and space. It is there
in the cosmic emrironment as a public property, but "split off
in our own personal history". It is a common reservoir or
soring of moral character and value. It makes a pragmatic dif-
ference to the life of every individual. It is the reward,
so to speak, or concomitant result of certain successfully
organized types of mental and organic adjustment and perfec-
tion.
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D. Consciousness and the Self.
We have seen that the religious realistic view of
consciousness is an adaptation from critical realism which is
akin to empirical objective idealism and is at issue with
tradltlnnal subjectivism. We also noted two points of view
or differentiation in interpreting the nature of conscious-
ness, namely; the energism of Montague and the universalism
of Boodin. Combining the two view/, we have as a result a
dialectic religious realism with regard to the nature of
consciousness and the self. This is the "actlvistic" view
expressed in D. C. Macintosh's explanation of the nature of
mind which will be considered in connection with the epis-
temology of realigious realism and the creativity of mind
In the next chapter.
Let us now at this point turn to the consideration
of the making of the self or personality, and the religious
realistic conception regarding it. While subjective idealism
conceived of the delf as the "soul" in the neo-platonic
transcendental sense, critical realism on the other hand
conceives of it in terms of the empirical self; and while
objective idealists, such as Royce, have failed to clearly
distinguish the individual finite self from the "absolute",
critical religious realisms have succeeded in making this
distinction emphatic. The more empirical type of objective
Idealism, however, as exemplified in the exponents of "per-
(0
sonal Idealism" has consistently emphasized this distinction
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between the finite individual and the Absolute Self.
The self, then, from the metaphysical point of
view according to religious realists is a "split off in our
own personal history". That is to say, the self is a uni-
fied "stream of consciousness", as William James had put it,
in the life of an individual human being. Self-consciousness
emerges or, as Boodin would say, is "added to a situation"
whenever an organism attains a sufficiently high degree of
complex integration and organization.
This complex integration and organization is mani-
fest in man as a psychophysical organism capable of purposive
action and rational adjustments both to internal and external
conditions. Man by Tirtue of hiB natural heritage, declares
Hugh Hartshorne, is equipped with organic structures which,
when subjected to the proper stimuli in the physical and
social environment, develop into a unique sense of selfhood
or awareness of self identity. (1) Man becomes aware or oon-
sclous of his own factual existence in the social environment
and in the aosmic universe. Thus the potentiality of Monta-
gue' s concent of energetic consciousness becomes atuallzed
or realized into a concrete individual self. The potential
and transcendental or objective consciousness of Boodin be-
comes in the self Immanent and differentiated into unioue
individual character or being and we call this man. The
self, obviously, is an individualized or differentiated
concrete center of conscious relation or spiritual energy.
(1) Hugh Hartshorne; in D. C.Macintosh ( ed
. ) RR, 146.
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From the empirical side of individuality, the self
is what we must take it as "being in conduct". The psycho-
physical organism is a "bund^le of tendencies, leadings,
purposive strivings an organization which comes to cons-
ciousness through conflict", and the self emerges as the
character or unity of the streams or flow of experiences,
guided from within by the energy of the purposive will, in-
terests, desires and feelings; and stimulated or "set off"
by external conditions or relations. The significance of
this empirical unity and what is involved in the being of
the self is well expressed by A. K. Rogers, saying:
As an experienced fact it is a unity of
a fairly definite and verifiable sort, character-
ized by such things as present felt unity of a cons-
clous field, a sense of intimate connection with
certain portions of the past, and In particular, a
range of purposes or dnds which anticipate in a de-
finable way the future. ... The re lie potentialities
(abstract consciousness) In the background which
are not fully realized completely; and these to all
appearance supply the source from which in some
sense the realized facts of experience in particular
spring. (1)
This implies that the self is more than what is obviously
presented in conduct, and this seems to me plausible. For
if the subconscious or the unconscious processes in man mean
anything they must have a bearing and significance for the
making of the character of personality, however abstract,
unempirical or unethical these may be.
Where the self or personality differs radically
from the mere psychophysical organism is the fact that cons-
ciousness with its laws of reason, meanings and values is
(1) A.K.Rogers; WT, 168.
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"superadded" to the organic and mental functlonings which
make for the unity and identity of the self-consciousness in
a concentric whole. Personality, then, becomes a compre-
hensive unity of the variegated diversity of experiences or
conduct, A person, it would follww, is a center of emotion,
reason and volition or will. The significance of the self
and its place in reality is fairly well characterized by
J. B. Pratt who says that "man with his spiritual nature is
a fact, the fundamental and central fact from which our whole
interpretation of the universe may well start'.' He says fur-
ther:
And if we start with man as he is, we
shall be led to recognize that Reality stretches
out beyond the realm of merely natural, that it
contains a sphere which may well be called the
Realm of the Spirit... .We know that there is a
spiritual realm, because we find that man cannot
be adequately understood or described without re-
cognizing the independent reality of the spirit.
We know that there is a supernatural realm be-
cause we find that we ourselves are in part mem-
bers of it. (1)
This may well be the core of the insight of religious realism,
for if there is ever a key to Reality or the clue to the real
existence of the divine Ideal, it is in and through the full
apprehension of the nature and character of moral and spirit-
ual self or personality.
Another empirical view of the self is presented
by W. K. Wright, in terms of ethical and social relations.
He speaks of the self as the establishment of organized habits
or "sentiments"; and "we may say that a man's sentiments (that
(1) J.B.Pratt; in D.C.Macintosh; RR, 53-4.
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is every thing, person, institution, and abstract conception
or ideal with reference to which his primary impulses have
become organized in sentiments) chiefly make him what he is,
or in other words , constitute his empirical moral self". (1)
To put it olainly, man's behavior or conduct is the index to
his character, personality or self. This of course is at
issue with Rogers who claims, as has been pointed out, that
the totality of an individual's objective experience or wak-
ing consciousness cannot wholly account for the breadth and
depth of the soul or self. Wright, however, from the social
standpoint takes the self as the comprehensive embodiment of
volitional experiences in social situations. As an empirical
fact, personality is a social product. Its character is de-
termined by its developed attitudes acquired in the social
environment; it emerges from the nature of his responsive-
ness, adjustive behavior or creative participation in social
situations and social conduct. Although Wright also recog-
nizes that the individual self is partly the product of an
inner or autonomous organization and control of instinctive
impulses and attitudes, he, however, asserts that the inter-
action of such inner organization with the common will de-
termines his true self, and his place in the social group to
which he belongs.
A very plausible and broader view of the self, it
seems to me, is Presented by Pratt. In the making of the
personality, he not only includes everything that is revealed
(1) W.K.Wright; GIE, 252, 256-7.
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or Implied "by the "empirical me" of Wright and all that is
involved in a present consciousness, but also embraces those
unconscious and subconscious elements that can contribute to
the character of the individual. His characterization of the
self is plainly stated thus:
Each self is of course characterized by
its present conscious state, but its present cons-
ciousness forms only a small portion of its nat-
ure. Much more important in making it what it is
are its memories, tendencies, sentiments, its pur-
poses and ideals. These do not exift in the form
of present consciousness. To make room, then, for
the most significant portion of the personality or
character we must have recourse to unconscious
mental organization. If there be a self at all,
character is surely a part of it, and character is
much more than consciousness. Any given passing
conscious state is thus merely an aspect or activ-
ity of the self. The self may be called a center
of psychic powers, whose characteristics necessa-
rily transcend any given section of conscious con-
tent or phase of conscious experience, and which
are essentially inexhaustible by any passing mo-
ment. (1)
In other words, the self is the sum total of organ-
ic tendencies, capacities for psychical activities, and their
interactions. These include the sensory processes of the
brain differentiating into qualitative significance; ideation
into complex meanings and values; feelings or emotional res-
ponses to meanings and values; and the rational control and
guidance of the reaction mechanism of the body and the nervous
system in accordance with ideals or the volitional choices of
the active will. "The self, then, is a genuine reality with
with a unity and Identity of its own, a center of influence
and energy and not to be confounded with a mere sum of qual-
ities or states". (2)
(1) J.B.Pratt; MS, 179-183
(2) Ibid, 181
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E. Recapitulation.
To sum up the religious realistic Interpretation of
the nature of consciousness, we may say that, as an integral
part of this dynamic Reality as a whole, consciousness is re-
cognized as a form of spiritual energy and a universal con-
dition of life, meanings and personal values. Further, it is
(thought of as differentiated into diverse personalities or
individual selves, both finite and divine. Personality, on
the other hand, as a differentiated individual self-conscious
ness, is Interpreted as the realization or emergence of a
spiritual being out of an internal, social and cosmic adjust-
ment of a psychophysical organism endowed with natural caoacl
ties and spiritual potentialities for active, purposive and
rational development.
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CHAPTER III.
MORAL EXPERIENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH.
We have seen in the previous chapter an interpre-
tation of experience in general in the light of the religious
realistic view of the nature of consciousness and the self.
In this connection, it was pointed out that it is based on
the theory of critical realism which is a dialectic synthesis
of subjective idealism and objective realism. It recognizes
the objective reality of consciousness in general as was
shown in the first chapter. It also recognizes the immanence
of consciousness In individual personal experience of selves.
Furthermore, a distinction was also made between two types
of religious realistic explanation; first, the enetgism of
Montague and second, the universalism of Boodin. It was
still further suggested that these two types do merge into
the actlvlstic view of consciousness. In connection with
the nature of the self, the empirical, social and broader
aspects of the making of personality were comprehensively
noted and considered.
The problem of this chapter is to determine ahat
moral experience is in the light of the religious realistic
theory of knowledge and truth. This will Involve the fol-
owing considerations; first, truth and common sense realism;
second, knowledge and the creativity of mind; third, truth
and the structure of the mind or the morphology of truth;
•1
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fourth, pragmatic realism or the relativity and practical va-
lue of truth; fifth, scientific realism as applied to relig-
ious knowledge and beliefs; and lastly, truth and its rela-
tion to volition and character. The most important concern
of consciousness, to my mind, lies in two directions, namely,
the search for knowledge and truth, and the realization of
value and character. Both knowledge and value have a large
and supremely important place in the making of moral experi-
ence. To restate the aim of this chapter let me quote the
simple title of a hook, What is Truth? by A. K. Rogers. The
bearing of truth in moral experience lies obviously in the
fact that honest thinking makes for honest living. Truth is
the ideal of thought as character is the ideal of conduct.
Both thought and conduct have an underlying motive, that is,
a desire for the attainment of intrinsic personal satisfac-
tion, for rational completeness on the one hand and for emo-
tional richness and abundance of spiritual life on the other.
A. Truth and Common Sense Realism.
To common sense realism, upon which critical and
religious realism is grounded, truth is what we know to be
true. Common sense, however, begs further reconstruction and
definition. One thing is certain in common sense, neverthe-
less, and that is, that ttuth rests on the knowledge of the
object, material or conceptual, which is regarded to be true.
"Truth for me", declares a critical dualist, "is what I cannot
help believing"^ Here, again, the a6t of believing presupposes
(1) A. K. Rogers; WT, 1.
= • '
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knowledge, or at least a partial understanding of what is
taken to be true; and upon such an understanding a certain
emotionalized act of faith is "built up or founded. This know-
ledge process Is attained by the use of concepts. Wieman in
one of his books says that "Truth is a verifiable belief....
A belief is verified by testing it experimentally and observ-
ing the consequences"
• (1) This experimental and pragmatic
procedure in the determination of the truth of any belief or
knowledge is accomplished, according to Wieman, by the use
of concepts. These concepts are "Intellectual devices which
enable us to do a number of things". They are the processes
of differentiation into distinctive meanings or Individual-
ization; representation or mediation of remote objects or
ideas; and inference from given data of experience. (2) With-
out concepts, he claims, there would be no truth, although
without them there is existential reality of which concepts
are symbols.
B. Knowledge and the Creativity of Mind.
Knowledge, then, is an Intellectual or conscious
process; and hence it presupposes an active self or at least
a mind that thinks and understands. In personal Interaction
with the surrounding environment, Wieman thinks, there are
three important factors involved: First, the impact of the
world upon the human organism. Second, the sensitivity and
responsiveness of the organism to this impact of the world
and the environment. Third, the fact of conscious awareness
(1) H.N. Wieman; WRT, 2*3-253. Quotation, 216.
(2) Ibid, 215-216.
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as Inherently a part of the psychophysical behavior and re-
sponse. (1) These factors involve, therefore, the consider-
ation of the structure of the mind and the nature of its pro-
cesses. Critical realism places a great importance upon this
phase of the creative activity of the mind.
The eplstemological problem of religious realism is
based primarily on the mutual Interaction between the world
and the mind. The critical reconstructive attitude of Mont-
ague in his The 7/ays of Knowing , and of Macintosh in his The
Problem of Knowledge tend toward eplstemological monism; while
the conciliatory attitude of Pratt in H|s Adventures in Phi -
losophy and Religion and Rogers in his What Is Truth? tend
toward dualism. Both of these tendencies, however, expressly
recognize the duality of thought and its object, and that
mind and thing exist Independently of their own right.
While religious realism recognizes the indeoendent
reality of both mind and its object, it nevertheless asserts
that they mutually interact in the knowledge experience, that
is, in actual perceptive process. Knowledge arises out of the
creative or active nature of mind which deals directly with
the external world; while the self-consciousness weaves toge-
ther in a concentric whole the meaning and values of the
stream of variegated experiences.
The historical development or movement toward an
activistic view of the nature of mind and consciousness is
recognized by Macintosh as very significant. ( 2) This activ-
istic theory of mind is based upon the empirical fact of the
(1) Op.cit., 215.
(2) D. (Macintosh; PK,314.
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causal efficacy of psychical processes. "Causality is pro-
ductive activity ... .The cause is something which does some-
thing else." This is the simple way by which Macintosh states
the principle of causality
. (1) Rogers defines causation as
not simply a passive and Ineffective relation between ante-
cedent and consequent events, but more significantly as an
"effective causality, in terms of conscious motive" which
makes a Dragmatic fllfference to the physical world. (2) Mont-
ague declares that "All true causality involves a transfer of
influence or energy from the causal agent (mind) to the pa-
tient (object) on which the effect is produced"
. (3) From
these assertions it may be gathered that religious realism
believes that all the psychical activities, sensations, per-
ceptions, memories, images, conceptions, judgments, reason,
feeling and will are bound up together in the creative activ-
ity of the mind or self.
In reply to the naturalistic neo-reallsts who charge
that this activistic view of mind and its power of interaction
with the outside world is a "confounded mystery", religious
realists would say that "no philosopher will ever suceeed In
flriving mystery out of the processes of life and consciousness
or from any other phase of real existence". Macintosh asserts
emphatically that "This mystery of creative psychical activity
is simply a special instance of the universal mystery of being
and especially of becoming"
• (4) Boodln, on the other hand,
offers his rebuttal against the charge declaring that;
(1) Op.cit., 316.
(2) A.K.Rogers; WT, 142, 187
(3) W. P.Montague; E-WJ, 119.
(4) D. C.Macintosh; PK, 314.
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We know mind for certain, at least in con-
nection with physiological processes we know it
nevertheless as pure better than we know anything
else we know mind as it is with its definite in-
ternal relations ... .Mind is distinct from conscious-
ness. Conscloasness is not mental but mental en-
tities are acts of consciousness. Mental processes
exist without consciousness. ... Consciousness added
to them bring forth significance. .. .There is nothing
mysterious about the structure of the mind and its
functioning as modern psychology would lead one to
believe .... But the fact is that we know vastly more
about the mental functioning than we do about cere-
bral functioning. ( 1)
C. Truth and the Structure of Mind: Morphology of Truth.
J, E. Boodin in his Truth and Reality has under-
taken an extensive analysis of the mechanism of mind and the
knowing process, and an examination of what constitutes truth
in Its relation to the subjective world of the individual
as well as social experience and also to the objective world
of reality. His thesis, briefly stated, is that truth is
whatever corresponds to reality as presented in experience,
or the "experience of identity" between an idea and the cor-
responding object, material or immaterial object of percept-
ion.
Let us now at this point consider the subjective
factors in the knowledge process or experience as set forth
by critical realists and Interpreted by Boodin. The experi-
ence of truth is founded on the realistic conception of "Mind
as Instinct" in its structure. (2) To state briefly, Boodin
holds that the mind is a structure potent with instinctive
tendencies for reaction and growth in response to external
(1) ExcerDibs from J. E. Boodin; CE, 220; RU, 152, 165.
(2) J. E. Boodin; TR, Chapt. II, lb-4-3.
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stimuli, both physical and social environment. To be sure
the mental equipment of man is radically different and higher
from that of the lower animal. The human brain and its ner-
vous system is much more highly complex and sensitive. This
view is corroborated in the author's other work, Cosmic Evo-
lution in what he calls "minded organism". He says:
Mind is not to be conceived as a stream
of events, but as energy structure, capable of se-
lective interaction and exchange with other energy
structures. It is a unique energy field, existing
in specific relations to other energy fields, such
as the instrumental bodily field, and the environ-
ing physical and mental field.... The minded organ-
ism no longer functions as a mere reflex mechanism.
It is capable of responding by means of memory,
Judgment, and reflective thought. It can appre-
ciate beauty, ascertain truth and recognize right.
...It is essentially a social pattern. (1)
There are three stages in the development of the
mental tendencies in relation to internal and external stimu-
li. These stages are as follow: (2)
1. The sensitive stage: This concerns with primary
instincts, which are "slots" as it were in a mechanism with
definite types of responses. These are aroused or "set off"
by certain definite stimuli. They are mechanical, autonomic
and motor coordinations. Out of these primary instinctive
responses emerges primitive consciousness or the vague sense
of awareness with regard to self and the external world. Some
confused sense of values, feelings and meanings also emerge.
They are part of the functioning or the dawning of conscious
intelligence and emotional impulses. They are made definite
by the method of trial and error development which involves
(1) J.E.Boodln; CE, 210-232; especially 212-217.
(2) TR, 19-20.
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Interests, habits and sentiments.
2. The associative-memory stage: In this stage
there are developed secondary instincts or impulses which are
differentiations of mental structure according to social pat-
terns of responses. The sense of reason and social conscious-
ness begin to be e s tabl 1 sh ed • JBdfe %e create new possibilities
of more highly complex reactions or adjustment to environment.
3. The reflective or rational stage: A further and
infinitely more complex structural variation of differenti-
ations appears in this stage. There is the development of the
power of analysis, abstraction, conception, meaning, and valu-
ation. This is 11 the most wonderful leap" in the human evolu-
tionary process. There appears also a new group of tendencies
or the demand for simplicity and consistency, for unity and
wholeness, for beauty, right, happiness and the demand for
truth, both scientific and religious truths. Herein evolves
the conscious search for reality and for the moral and relig-
ious ideal.
The mind, then, has three significant stages of de-
velopment; the sensitive or individual, the associative or
social, and the reflective or normative stages. There is no
sharp line of distinction, however, among these stages; and
their development depends upon the degree of self organiztion
and the condition or character of the environment. The goal
or end for which the evolution of mental development is di-
rected is toward the attainment of the highest degree of
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consistent knowledge or truth and value In the realization of
moral character. In other words, the mind "by its nature and
purpose seeks the most complete revelation of truth and high-
est good in reality. The search for knowledge and truth is
an Important factor in moral experience. Furthermore, the
emergence of intlelllgence and the power of reason gives rise
to certain levels of thinking. These are:
1. The level of perception: In this level the mind
projects outward into the objective world, the external sti-
muli by which the mind develops the power of coordination,
relating things and events in space and time. Here also lies
the development of the power of social immltation.
2. The level of empirical generalisation: This is
the level of mental economy by means of which, through pro-
cesses of deduction and induction, the mind frees itself from
the bondage or dependence on external facts. The logical
mind abstracts from given data of experience or concrete em-
pirical situations, a synthesis or principle involving uni-
formity, Identity, quality, quantity, causality and inter-
pretation of internal and external relations or meanings. (1)
3. The level of idealization: At this level, the mind
not only abstracts from experience or generalizes certain
facts, but also creates a higher supersynthesis. That is to
say, the mind considers not what experiences are but.experi-
n
ence ou&ht to be in the light of a rational ideal involving
first, the unity of the whole of life; second, harmonious
(1) Op.cit.
,
44-63.
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consistency or coherence of the parts with the whole, eland
third, the clear cut simplicity of the total relationship
and harmonious interaction within the whole of life.
D. Pragmatic Realism: Practical and Relative Truth.
We may say, then, from the foregoing analysis of
the mind, that complete knowledge is the ideal of the intel-
lectual life. Inner consistency of the mind and its ideas
is one of the two principal factors of the truth experience.
The other factor is objective consistency and value. Know-
ledge is true or valid, relatively in so far as it approxi-
mates the ideal truth and consistent with the objective real
world. Subjectively, truth or valid Judgment requires that
the mind attains a coherent unity which generates a dynamic
and creative personality. Any Judgment or belief has the
greatest possibility of being true when It is consistent with
the inner life as a whole, free from self-contradiction, and
conducive to the moral worth and growth of the individual
personality. Belief is an act of faith founded on the degree
of reasonableness with the inner life. This Is recognized by
critical religious realists
W. P. Montague distinguishes six distinct attitudes
in the attainment of logical consistency .( 1) These attitudes
which are the elemental sources of knowledge and beliefs are
authoritative testimony, mystical intuition, critical reason,
experience or sense perception, oragmatic practicalism and
scepticism or honest dou1>t. None of these alone gives an
(1)*. P. Montague; WK, 224-234.
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adequate criterion for certainty of belief or knowledge; but
a systematic discrimination and combination of these into
coherent "federation" would most likely offer adequate con-
sistency and validity. They are, as Montague believes, cap-
able, with certain modifications, of being combined with one
another; and the solution for certain valid Judgment is a
federation of the six attitudes "in harmonious syHthesis".
It is apparent, then, that mere subjective consist-
ency is not a complete criterion of truth, according to crit-
ical realism. (1) A Judgment must find an objective ground
in reality to which the subjective processes should agree or
correspond. Otherwise, there would be no distinction between
truth and error, fact and illusion. The truth experience
must manifest in an "experience of identity" or "correspond-
ence" between the inner and the outer world, the identity or
correspondence of the object of perception and the real ob-
ject that is perceived.
For pragmatism, asserts Boodln, mind is no longer
a merely complex mechanism of ideas, nor can the significance
of thought be expressed in the formal or subjective relations
of intellectuallstlc logic. Mental activities must be ex-
pressed in terms of needs, interests and satisfactions. These
practical satisfactions are realized in the "adaptive congru-
ities between a conative structure and a specific environment"
Obviously, there must be a correspondence at least between a
subjective idea and the objective reality. (2) A true and
(1)A.K.Rogers; WT, 11-12.
(Sjffi.E^BoQdin; XiqpC25XXJ.CE, 222-3.
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valid Judgment must, in other words, have a reference to
physical, social and cosmic reality and value "existing be-
yond the apperceptive unity of momentary individual conscious-
ness" Reality and value are dependent upon the cognitive mo-
ment not for their existence but for their meaning in personal
experience. ( 1) The object of thought must, then, enter into
relation with mental processes and personal consciousness,
for "thought is so wedded to things that things cannot exist
without being thought."
What has been said about the intimate relation be-
tween the mind and its object or thought and thing implies
that the external objects, things, persons, relations or
ideals, do have objective existence and reality apart from
the perceiving mind; but it implies also that their meanings
and values cannot be determined apart from their being per-
ceived by conscious minds. They are known in oonsclous ex-
perience. And the validity or truth of the oerceptual Judg-
ment is discovered in their fitness, identity or correspond-
ence with the real objective existence to which they refer.
Hence, pragmatic realism, according to religious realism is
the affirmation of the thesis that the truth of every idea,
Judgment or knowledge must be determined by the meat complete
A satisfactory inner consistency and objective practicality or
harmony with the facts of the external world. Critical mon-
ism and dualism both find on this basis their common ground
in their epistemology . Macintosh states :
(l)J.S.Boodin; TR, 251-3.
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By this (critical monism) is meant the
doctrine that the object perceived is exlstent-
ially, or numerically, Identical with the real
object at the moment of perception, although the
real object may have qualities that are not per-
ceived at the moment; and also that this same
object may exist when unpercelved, although not
necessarily with all the qualities which it pos-
sesses when perceived ... .If
,
then, we define knowV-
2Tedge as certainty of the nature of reality, eith-
er in immediate givenness or in true Judgment
it will be readily apparent that if there is im-
mediate knowledge of Independent reality in nor-
mal perception, there may also be mediate know±-
Zedge of independent reality through the process
of thought and that the immediate knowledge has
made the mediate knowledge possible. (1)
This seems to me a fairly clear statement of the critical
realistic view, and it offers the possibility of^ knowledge of
God through the immediate knowledge of natural, social and
cosmic environment.
Critical religious realism, therefore, is in its
epistemology synthetic and reconstructive in its essential
character. There are three essential phases in arriving at
truth. First: That what is true is simply the real consider-
ed as the object of a possible conscious belief or Judgment.
When the object is real, the Judgment in regard to it must
be real. This is modified pan-objectivism. Second: That
what is true is whatever would be (fonfirmed by an all -compre-
hending mind or absolute experience. Truth is comformabllity
to further experience. This is reconstructed pan-subjectiv-
ism. Third: That what is true is whatever in the individual
corresponds to what exists outside the individual. This is
the identity of the ,, intra-individual ,, (idea) with the
(1)D. C.Macintosh; PK, 310-335. Quotation, 310-311.
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"extra-Individual" (object). This is synthetic dualism or
critical monism. (1)
E. Scientific Realism Applied to Religious Knowledge.
Thus we see the obvious emphasis of religious real-
ists on the objectivity of knowledge and truth. It is on
this Incentive for the objectivity of truth that seience has
come to an important place in religious realism. "Scientific
method", declares Macintosh, "is or claims to be, the uni-
versally valid way of proving the truth of true Judgments
about reality and of discrediting the claims of Judgment which
are not true. This presupposes the notion of truth, which, as
everyone who has not been tampered with knows, is some sort
of agreement or correspondence or identity between the idea
and the reality or subject-matter about which it is predicat-
ed, judged to be true". (2) In fact the scientific spirit in
religion is emphatically stressed by H . N. Wleman in his book,
Religious Experience and Scientific Method , and D. C. Mac-
intosh in his Theology As An Empirical Science .
"Experimental realism in religion" seeks to interpret
religious faith, ideals and beliefs in terms of verifiable
objective experience and their values. Religion must be sub-
jected to the rigor and vigor of analysis and evidence. Our
ideas about G-od must find their practical validity and truth
by means of their relations with the divine objective Reality
as presented in experience. Macintosh fairly and clearly
states the main issue:
(1) Compare W.P.Montague; WK, 319-413 or 311-2; A.K.Rogers
WT, 68; J.B.Pratt, APR, 136-9; MS, 164-5; J .E.Boodin, TR,251
(2) D.C.Mac intosh; RR, 329.
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We have been led to make a distinction
between Judgments which we have a moral right to
believe to be true and Judgments which we know to
be true, and the difference is made by the fact
that In the latter instance we have been able to
employ the scientific method of verification....
What we can experience we can know. If there is
an Independently existing physical world and if
we can nave genuine first-hand experience of it,
so that what it is as reality is at least partly
presented within the field of our direct obser-
vation, we can know it, at least in part. The
same statement may be made about the human self,
and about the religious object, God.... If there
is an independently existing religious object, or
God, as religious realism maintains, and if we
can have any direct experience of this divine real-
ity, we can have some genuinely verified, or sci-
entific, religious knowledge. (1)
When we speak of verified beliefs, says Wieman in
The Issues of Life , we mean beliefs that are supported by
sufficient evidence to Justify us in accepting them and living
by means of them. (2) This evidence is attained by the sci-
entific approach which has a four-fold function. The four
functions are: First, the formation of an idea as to what
course of action will produce specific consequences by obser-
ving various possible consequences that have issued forth from
various specific conditions. Second, the determination as
accurately as possible of Just what the conditions are under
which this course of action can best be profitably followed
to produce the desired and anticipated consequences. Third,
the creation of such conditions for the performance of the
course of action taken and the observation of what haopens.
Fourth, the development by logical inference of what to ex-
pect in the light of what has been observed to haopen, ^rrffl
(1) Dp.cit., 332-3.
(2) H.N. Wieman; IL, 179-192.
c*
•
•
43
and then finally testing these inferences in the same manner
as the original idea was tested through the previous processes.
Experience, then, does not yield knowledge or truth unless it
is subjected to the right scientific method. But, on the
other hand, there is no knowledge without experience. ( 1)
Over against this issue religious realism finds
an adequate justification in Christianity. "Jesus remains
for us", declares Boodln, "the choicest incarnation of cosmic
genius in the warm flesh of mother earth.... It means the
creative incarnation of divinity, not merely in individual,
but in society .... It makes for creative wholeness of life,
as broad as humanity, yea as expansive as the cosmfcs . . . . God
is too vast for our limited imagination, too rich for our
abstract thought. His is the creative genius of the ages
the genius of infinite cosmos" .(2) The reality of God is,
to the religious realist, revealed to us in our experience,
in the experience of the race and in the personality of Jesus
which is the most concrete and complete revelation of God's
nature end reality.
F. Truth and Its Relation to Volition and Character.
LAt us recapitulate the essential points involved
in the religious realistic theory of knowledge and its rela-
to moral experience. We noted at the outset that what com-
mon sense would call truth or belief does, as a matter of fact,
imply deeoer considerations than what seem to apoear on the
surface of common ordinary thinking. Knowledge has been
(1) OD.cit., 190-192.
(2)J.E.Boodin; CE, 470-1.
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shown to Involve the creativity of the mind endowed with a
mechanism for instinctive and integrative reactions and in-
teractions with the external world, and with the capacity for
growth and development out of which emerges the intellectual
life or the rational self. We have noted also that in the
search for truth the conscious mind not only seeks consis-
tency, unity, and harmony within its subjective processes,
"but also projects outward into the objectively real world
for satisfactory verifications and practical values in life;
and truth is attained relative to the degree of success in
this objective process. This objective process was also
shown to manifest in the pragmatic or scientific method which,
when applied to the realm of religion, offers grounds for the
validity and relative certainty of religious truths.
The problem of truth for religious realism, there-
fore, must take account of scientific procedure and recognize
the laws of thought, reason and beliefs. Furthermore, the
thinking processes must be looked upon as a form of volitional
conduct involving intellectual Interests and satisfactions for
the practical needs of the moral life; it is an adjustive pro-
cess in the sense that the mind seeks to choose, select or
discriminate between the Tightness and wrongness of ideas,
beliefs and judgments. (1) Truth is to thought as value is to
desire. In either case the human free will underlies the
process of its realization^. Thought is the systematic ac-
tivity of the will; the will sets off to thinking and
(l)J.E.Boodin; TR, 67-85; 126-7.
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postulates certain laws and norms. The relative success in
the discovery of truth is in itself an intrinsic value which
contributes to the moral character of the individual. Truth
is the "regulator of conduct", a principle of individual moral
control. Merely to think of a concept, says Wleman, does not
make it either true of false. It is only when some claim is
maile for that concept that it becomes constitutive of truth
or error. And the claim must always be something of prac-
tical value as the result of experimental operation with the
concept put into the form of a hypothesis or belief. (1) In
other words, truth, moral and religious truths must find their
place in actual experience for their meaning and value, both
to the individual and^social order.
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CHAPTER IV.
MORAL VALUE AND THE PROBLEM OF CHARACTER.
Hitherto we have considered experience in terms of
religious realistic metaphysics and eplstemology , and we are
now about to consider it in terms of moral value. In the
first chapter we noted the religious realistic dynamic view
of the universe, and found that psychic or conscious experi-
ence is an integral part of reality. In the senond chapter
we examined comprehensively the nature of consciousness and
how It Is differentiated into individual selves through per-
sonal experience or the inner integration and social adapta-
tion ofpsychophysical organism. And in the third chapter we
reflected upon the bearing of knowledge and truth, as critical
religious realists conceived them, in moral experience. In
this regard we noted that consistent knowledge and coherent
truth must find, in experience, Identity or correspondence
with objective reality. This objectivity of truth determines
the practical value of the knowledge experience, which is es-
pecially significant in the realms of moral and religious ex-
perience, to the moral growth of personality.
A. The Nature and Meaning of Value: Realistic View.
£ Another way of expressing the same idea stated at
the beginning of the previous chapter is that concerning in-
dividual experience there are two important aspects Involved:
First, the formal demand of the intellectual side of life,
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reason, knowledge and truth. Second, the demand of the emo-
tional or volitional side of life or conduct, the demand of
will, feelings, desires and the call for satisfactions, the
fulfillment of instinctive impulses and conscious purposes.
This may be said to be the valuatlonal aspect of moral experi-
ence. Knowledge of Itself, however, is also a value, a means
to truth which is intrinsically an intellectual value in per-
sonal life. The experience of truth answers the demand for
mental satisfaction. In this chapter we are concerned with
moral values that contribute to the character of the individ-
ual; that is to say, the realization of man's spiritual na-
ture, a being endowed with the will and organic mechanism as
means to the fulfillment of the objectives of life. Personal
intrinsic values are determined by the way in which the inner
structure and constitution of man are organized and controlled
in volitional conduct. This, in brief, is the realistic in-
terpretation of value experience.
Wieman's realism conceives of value as in a sense
a meaningful experience; that is, not that all experiences
and events have meanings, but that there are "meaningless ex-
periences". It is only when value is attached to these ex-
periences that they have meaning. "Meaning is the mental
instrument", defines Wleman, "by which we control experience
and magnify its value." Life mounts in value, he continues
to say, and security just in so far as we bring into operation
the right meanings and use them rightly. "The whole problem
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of human life, in a nutshell, is just this: How to magnify
the values and security of life". (1) This in substance is
the principle of the revaluation of values through creative
reconstruction of the meaning of personal experience. And
this is the common function of morality and religion. In
other words, we may way that "The deepest drive of human life
is to render itself more abundant. To be^come more abundant
means to have access to wider ranges of exoerience for use
and enjoyment. The one supreme and indispensible means to
this increase of life is meaning". (2) The meaning experience
as applied to religion, it seems to me, is simply the mystical
experience in prayer, communion and worship. Worship at its
best, according to Wieman, is precisely this: "It is the great
regenerator, renewer, and reconstructor of human life because
it fosters that experience which provides for the extreme re-
construction of meanings"
. (3)
Realistically, then, the values of life are appre-
hended through some sort of immediate experience, intuitive
knowledge, or mystical awareness of meanings or human and di-
vine purposes. The fulness of conscious experience Is il-
lumined by its meaning and value to life. TheBe meanings and
values are realized in personal integration of the individual
with the total environment.
B. The Objectivity of Value and the Moral Judgment.
The mere possibility of intuitive knowledge or mys-
tical awareness of meanings and values seem to imply th o-
(1) H.N. Wieman; RSSM, 324-5.
(2) Ibid, 330, 339.
(3) Ibid, 345.
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the objectivity of value and the moral Judgment. It seems to
me that this objectivity of value is the essential ground of
the ethics of religious realism. Let me quote a religious
realist on this matter:
The realm of values is independent of any
and all natural processes and has its own a priori
validity ... .Values are given a priori, but they are
given as bearers of content, (or meaning) not empty
nor dependent upon the validity of a merely formal
principle of duty ... .Values must be experienced in
and for themselves (that is Intrinsic values). They
are not constructions of a synthetic activity of un-
derstanding, nor deducible on the basis of purely
rational principle .( 1)
This seems to imply that in the constitution of the real uni-
verse there are certain relations or meanings which when
brought into an empirical situation with conscious minds do
emerge; that is to say, the individual becomes aware of their
presence and significance in experience. Boodln says that
"the unique contribution which is made by the experience re-
lation is the world of values", ^nd then he further asserts
that "Values have their basis in the relation of objects, with
their qualities, to the realization of the will''. (2)
Values, then, are objective in the sense that they
subsist or inhere in reality as a whole; but like knowledge
they must be realized in personal or conscious experience.
They become empirically real to the individual who experi-
ences them; they exist potentially in the formal aspect of
the realistic universe. This' affirmed by Boodin in his state-A
ment that:
They (values) are qualifications of the
(1) D. C.Macintosh; HR, 78.
(2) J.E. Boodln; RU, 107.
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objective world .... They are unique characteristics
within certain relations, implying a specific type
of organization. They are just as much a part of
the real world under their own conditions as are
the unique properties of water within their own
special system. ... The values of things are derived
from their being taken up into the process of con-
scious realization. ( 1)
An important point in this realistic thought is that values
are not created, for in essence they already exist; but that
consciousness discovers them in experience. The values for
which human beings strive to attain are there in the real
world by divine creation or gift, and it is for man to real-
ize them in volitional activity. It is on this basis that
the objectivity of the moral judgment in realistic ethics is
founded. Just as ideas must find their truth and validity
in the objective world so ethical principles or moral judg-
ments must also find their objective value in the realm of tW*
objectively real values.
C. The Good As Empirical Value in Moral Experience.
Values, then, from the empirical point of view may
be said to be the creative realization of personal experience.
They are the meanings or quality of experience or conduct.
In order to have value there must be the fulfillment of organ-
ized tendencies of the self or Interests in terms of its ob-
jects. An object has value whenever it satisfies a certain
complex organization of Impulses or instinctive tendencies
.
(2)
In other words, a value is that which is desired, or the ob-
ject of inner nature. It is the significance of conscious
(1) Oo.cit., 109-110.
(2) 0p.cit., 13b.
....
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experience with reference to the realization of the object of
personal will and interest. "An object has value," declares
Montague, "to the extent that it can fulfill a potentiality".
Potentiality is used here in the sense that man is born with
organic or instinctive mechanism capable of psychic manifest
tations and value experience. (1)
In terms of motives and the fulfillment of interest,
Wleman characterizes value or the good as follows:
The good is any fulfillment of interest.
Interest is any motor-affective attitude .... Interest
may be more or less inclusive. Love at its best is
the most complete integration of the greatest number
and diversity of interests of the individual and of
associated individuals. The supreme good is fulfill-
ment of the most inclusive interest, or, if one pre-
fers the phrase, of the most inclusive system of in-
terest. .. .Value is inherent in the totality of all
being because that totality is inherently related to
human living ... .Value is objective; it is "out there"
Just as much as anything else Is out there although
it can not be unrelated to human living any more
than the rest of the universe can be unrelated to hu-
man living. .. .Interest constitutes value; but human
interest is always much more than human.... It (value)
is a character pertaining to the ultimate cause. (2)
This statement has a four-fold implication: First, the uni-
versality of value or goodness. Second, the inherent or po-
tential capacity of the universe of values to respond to human
interest in fulfillment of human needs and aspirations. Third,
the necessity of creative interaction between the universe and
the individual , or man's adjustlve behavior with his environ-
ment in order to realize his values. And fourth, evil and
suffering enter into experience either as the frustration of
Interest or the sacrificing of lesser interest for the greater
(1) W.P.Montague; BU, 29.
( 2 ) H.N. Wleman; ART, 160-165.
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and more Inclusive interest, in which case suffering becomes
a "transmuted evil". Individual moral growth or the develp-
ment of personality depends upon the relatively Increasing
capacity to progressively reorganize into more and more in-
clusive system all its Interests in its interaction with its
immediate environment and with the "order of the greatest
possible value" or God.
D. Classification of Values.
Let us now at this point consider the realistic
classification of these realizable values. The objective
character of values makes possible, according to moral real-
ism, the classification of them though only in an arbitrary
manner. Wright, In his chapter on "Eudaemonism" to which sys*
tem of ethics he is committed, classifies values into two gen-
eral groups, instrumental and intrinsic. "Values are intui-
tively recognized by men when they emerge upon a sufficiently
high level of development; but the means by which those valued
can be attained successfully can only be learned through ob-
servation and experience, and the calculation of consequences'^
(1) The recognition of virtues, however, has been a gradual
process in moral evolution, "not yet complete, and that per-
haps never shall be complete". Just as truth is relatively
apprehended, so is value or the good in its intrinsic form ref
latlvely realized. Moral perfection or absolute goodness as
the ideal of finite personality lies in its fullest possibi-
lity in the nature and being of the Cosmic life of the world;
(1)W. K.Wright; G-IE, 33^-349.
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that Is to say in the being of God. This apoears to me to be
the essential implication of the objective realism of values.
"God is that structure which sustains, promotes and consti-
tutes supreme value. It may be infi lite"
.
( 1) This is the
faith of pieman, the impersonal realist.
A value is intrumental when its worth is measured
by its consequences, and not an end in itself; it is intrin-
sic when its worth stands on its own account, as an end in
itself. Material values or values derived from things physi-
cal are Instrumental; they serve as means to the realization
of higher personal ends. Intrinsic values reside only in per-
sons; they are consummatory values or ends in personal life
realized in experience. ( 2)
Economic values: Wright and Wieman give economic
value an intrinsic quality, not in the sense of the utility
of things but in the attainment of skill and control of eco-
nomic goods or material wealth. It is obvious that such an
attainment as prudential economy in the control and production
or increase of wealth is a personal value, especially in this
capitalistic age; it would seem to be just as mueh intrinsic
as the value derived in abstract rational thinking skill. It
is an art of business life; and an art is an intrinsic end.
"Life itself is impossible, "says Wright, "without means of
subsistence. Character does not reach its best development
in dire want, with little opportunity for recreation and the
enjoyment of friendship; nor can education, art, and religion
(3)thrive without economic support" . This clearly brings out
(1) H.N. Wieman; IL, 111-112.
(2) W.K. Wright; GIE, 338.
(5) Lw.cH., 33 S .

54
the relative importance of economic values in personal living.
Bodily, recreational and associational values: Phy-
sical vigor is an intrinsic condition for mental and conscious
personal energy. "To have a symmetrical body", says Wright,
"and to keep it in good condition is worth while for its own
sake".(l) Playing for the sheer love of recreation is a great
enjoyment in itself. And the associational values of friend-
ship and comradeship, or the real love between mother and
child, husband and wife, are values which give high degree of
intrinsic enjoyment and happiness in personal life. These
bodily, recreational, and associational values are instrument-
al as well as intrinsic, according to moral realists, for they
further the development of a higher value, that is character.
Character or complete moral personality, therefore,
is the ultimate intrinsic good. Aesthetic, intellectual and
religious values are ends in themselves, integral parts of
moral character; they are the Interwoven factors that make
moral character and whole personality. Each have their own
autonomous wholeness, but interact with each other in a well
proportioned or balanced personal life. Religious values are
considered to be of preeminent importance in the making of
the good life. Prayer, praise and worship are good in them-
selves; and divine communion is the highest form of love and
blessedness. "Religion in general is reacting to something
as though it were that to which all human life should be de-
voted. Religion of the sort we wish to advocate is dedicating
(1) Op.cit., 339
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life In supreme devotion to that order of existence and pos-
sibility which provides the highest values which ever can be
actualized"
.
(1) This is Wieman 1 s attitude that religious ex-
perience is a consummatory value of the highest order in hu-
man living; it is also affirmed by Wright when he says that
"Love of G-od and service to humanity are indispensable aspects
of the religious life; neither can be neglected without im-
pairing the other". (2)
E. The Subjective Process in Value Experience.
Passing now from the objective and empirical aspects
of v»lue, let us at this point turn to the subjective or the
organic basis of value experience. A. K. Rogers believes that
man is a creature who is engaged primarily in the endeavor to
satisfy his desires. (3) He implies, of course, that man's or-
ganic constitution or mental make up is so organized as to
seek their objective expression or fulfillment, the satisfac-
tion of instinctive or imoulsive tendencies. Like other or-
ganisms, the human species must have satisfactions in order to
live. These human satisfactions, however, Include not only
natural or biological fulfillments but much more important
also moral and spiritual values. For man satisfaction is a
"feeling state of enjoyment" and real satisfaction is attain-
able only as it "meets the full possibilities of human nature"
including the demands upon intellectual approval and self-res-
pect. (4) Moreover, the fact of feeling or emotion is an es-
sential condition of value experience. It involves the
(1) H.N. Wieman; IL, 135.
(2) W.K.Wright; G-IE, 343.
(3) A.K.Rogers; TE, 43.
(4) Ibid, 4b.
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organization of native tendencies or instincts.
The organic basis of satisfactions are, therefore,
the native instincts and impulses. "An instinct is an in-
herited impulse, not so mechanistic as reflex but adaptable
to different situations and subject to training"
.
(1) Out of
these instincts are developed habits, sentiments or emotions
and character. And an^ impulse is an "enduring disposition
of the human organism" imbedded in the structure of the brain
and nervous system. They are sometimes active and other times
Inactive. They are aroused to action through stimulation eith-
er from without or from within the organism. They include ap-
petites or desires calling for actions in order to "effect a
more favorable change in the situation in which the person is
placed". This is to say, they demand emotional satisfactions;
and the degree of fulfillment and frustration determines the
Intensity or quality of the value experience. Goodness,
Tightness, and happiness are born empirically of successful
or pleasant sensations and satisfactions; while their oppo-
site disvalues come from failure to attain them which is fol-
lowed by unpleasant effects to personal life; hence, disap-
proved. Wieman speaks of the process of "assimilation" in
which "habitual responses fall into a system" and that this
"is constantly developing into greater complexity". New im-
pulses come in conflict with established habits and their as-
similation establishes new and more complex habits or senti-
ments. The significance of this process is obvious. "This
(1)W. K.Wright; GTE, 199-212.
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means the progressive organization of an ever more complex
system ob habits. This means coming into converse with ever
more of the fullness of the world. This means progressive
adaptation to an ever more ample environment, entering into
a fuller life".(l)
F. Realization of Values: Standard of Moral Judgment.
According to religious realism, then, these com-
plex Instincts, Impulses and their attending emotions are the
basis of value experience, habits, sentiments and idealiza-
tions in conduct. "A- sentiment is an organization, with ref-
erence to some object, of the most powerful and persistent
human impulses ... .Every sentiment of every individual both
helps to determine, and also is determined by, his character
as a whole". (2) To put it briefly, character virtues depend
upon the quality of these established sentiments or habits.
And now we may ask ourselves, "What are the under-
lying conditions in the actualization of values in life?"
More plainly, how are the goods of life determined? This in-
volves the theoretical consideration of moral Judgments. How
then does religious realism evaluate the goodness or evilness
of experience? To answer this query, let us examine the real-
istic theories of moral judgments. Briefly, religious real-
ism holds to the systematic approach in determining the nature
of goodness. In other words, a moral judgment would include
considerations of the elements of feeling, desire, will, pur-
pose, reason and conscience which enter into moral experience.
(1) H.N.Wieman; RESM, 292.
(2) W. K.Wright; G-IE, 212, 217.
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These elements may be crystalized Into such systems as eudae-
monism, intultionism, formalism, utilitarianism and rational-
Ism.
1. Eudaemonism: Universal welfare and happiness.
The eudaemonistic system of Wright tends to be synthetic,
leading toward a humanitarian social gospel with cosmic and
religious world outlook. Eudaemonism is the attempt to com-
bine and harmonize the different tyoes of ethical criteria in
the realization and apprehension of the moral good. Accord-
ing to this system, the good or "summum bonum" is identified
with social welfare, universal happiness and well being, "the
full and free development of all capacities, and the attain-
ment of all value". It is a type of "perfectionism", univer-
sal utilitarianism or altruistic individualism .( 1) It is
characterized thus:
Eudaemonism is therefore intuitional in
its recognition of values, and teleological and
empirical in its formulation of moral judgments.
...Seeks that social order which will be most fa-
vorable to the general attainment of individual
welfare. A life of welfare is an active life; man
finds his good in advancing with struggle and ef-
fort from lower to ever higher levels of attainment.
It is also a happy life, since it is accompanied
by the satisfaction that attends full and free ex-
pression of one's personality in harmony with o-
thers. . . .Haooiness accompanies the harmonious syn-
thesis of all impulses and sentiments in a unity. (2)
This seems to me to be a plausible and commendable system of
ethics; for after all life, if it means anything, is an active
service, and one's individuality and usefulness is greatly if
not wholly determined by his relationship and value wirth the
(1) Op.citl, 334-354.
(2) Dp.cit., 334-5.
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with the great society of persons.
2. Intuitlonism: The element of feeling. If values
have objective existence, as religious realists assert, then
they may be apprehended a priori; and as a matter of fact,
Wright claims that the mind "directly cognizes the distinction
between good and evil much as it perceives the difference be-
tween blue and yellow or between identity and difference" in
a sort of "direct realism". (1) To adopt Boodin' s theory of
transcendental consciousness as presented in chapter two, the
self becomes aware of these values when they are brought Into
certain definitely organized situation in relation to its ex-
perience. This is the intuition of common sense guided by
feeling and reflection; as "moral Judgments are obvious to any
one with reasonable Intelligence".
One thing is quite clear; and that is, a critically
trained mind attains the ptfer of Immediate or mystical appre-
hension of values whenever they are presented in perception
or in definite situations. Rogers in his Theory of Ethics
writes of "The Objectivity of the Moral Judgment" in which
he states that to say "a desire is objectively good would
mean that the world-— is so constituted that a certain ob-
ject tends to call forth in me a feeling of approval this
feeling lending a new shade of significance to the objective
situation"
.
( 2) In an article in the International Journal of
Ethics the same writer discusses "Feeling and the Moral Judg-
ment" in which he declares that "A feeling is a part of the
(1) Or>.cit., 284.
(2) A. K.Rogers; TE, 59-99.
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universal scheme; It arises under specific conditions that
involve objective causes, and it nlays a role that may have
all sorts of consequences for man's future life....A feeling
attached to a particular set of circumstance will lead to a
definite action. .." (1) This is to say that the immediate
sense of "oughtness" is intuitive, and indeed, accompanied
with feeling of obligation or conscience or some immediate
sense of direction for instinctive or conscious action. A
thing is good or better because of the feeling that we "ought"
to desire and realize it;and the autonomy of this feeling of
oughtness resides in the autonomy of inner conscience.
It seems obvious that "in ordinary affairs of life
a man can trust his conscience and his common sense to tell
him what it is that is right for him to do"; and although, as
Wright claims, intuition can not afford a complete point of
view in ethical life; yet intuitions have always put great
emphasis on "purity of motives and Integrity of character",
and that there are certain moral axioms that can be appre-
hended intuitively
.
(2) Moral values are, in fact, first of
all immediately experienced; and then critically evaluated
afterwards "in the growing process of rationalizing human
life". However much the standards of values and moral Judg-
ments are constructed by reason, feeling "still remains a
determinant in the judgment" according to Rogers. Feeling in
interaction with reason, in my opinion, constitutes the ra-
tional criterion of inner conscience which carries within
(1)A^IURdgers; Int.Jr.Eth . 40(1929), 15-36.
(2) W.K. Wright; GIB, 297.
cf
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Itself an adequately valid authority. Feeling short of reason
cannot be taken as an adequate guide to the determination of
the supreme good in life. In the whole, this is the convic-
tion of religious realists.
3. Formalism: Element of will, volition, freedom.
A third element in the systematic criterion of moral Judgment
is that of the will. This may "be called the formal aspect of
value Judgment. Macintosh in The Reasonagbleness of Christ-
tlanity has given a chanter to the consideration of freedom
as the necessary implication of "Moral Optimism" or religious-
ly moral meliorism which is "a fundamental attitude of confi-
dence in the cosmos, together with a full sense of man's mo-
ral reponsibili ty"
, (1) Moral optimism is to the author the
highest aspiration of man; and herein lies the reasonableness
of Christianity, for the highest ideals embraced by it are
practicable, progressively realizable and will ultimately be
conserved in the immortality of personality. Christian moral
optimism expresses the conviction that "if only a person's
will is right, he need have no fear of anything the universe
can do to him; no absolute or final disaster can come to him
whofie will is steadfastly devoted to the true ideal". (2) Mo-
ral optimism requires an autonomous power within the will of
the Individual for spiritual self-direction and realization.
>*nd moral responsibility requires the freedom of will in
volitional conduct. Man becomes moral only when he is free;
and freedom is the reasonable basis and core of Christian
(1) D. C.Macintosh; RC, 26-63.
(2) Ibid, 46.
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morality. Macintosh declares:
In the first place, no morality can be
regarded as fundamentally reasonable unless it is
essentially free....^nd it ought to be quite evi-
dent that if this power of moral Judgment is to
be developed, the individual must be allowed free-
dom to use his own Judgment in appreciating ends
as good and observing what means are most effec-
tive in working toward good ends.... It belongs es-
sentially to Christianity to affirm whatever free-
dom is involved in moral responsibility .( 1)
This, it is clear, gives emphasis on Christian formalism or
the freedom of the will. Obviously, the essential character
of true religion in general and Christianity in particular
lies in the placing of importance to the autonomy of the in-
ner life of will. Good will or righteousness is attained
with divine grace, but it implies absolute freedom of choice
in the shaping of the individual's moral life in conduct.
The fact of responsibility, then, for conduct and
value is founded on the autonomy of the will, freedom is the
underlying presupposition of ethical life. It is what makes
a man moral with power of self-determination. ( 2) Conduct or
behavior acquires moral significance only when the subject is
a free being. "If every thing that a man does were mechani-
cally determined, like the rolling of a stone downhill, logi-
cally we could neither praise nor blame him for anything that
he did, nor pass a moral Judgment of any kind of him". (3)
Freedom is inseparable with moral responsibility. Man is
clearly the moral sovereign of his own personality; and the
character of his life is determined by the free choices he
makes as directed by his autonomous will.
(1)Op.cit., 27, 62.
(2) 0p.cit., 62.
(3) W.K.Wright; GTE, 275.
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Wright, however, criticizes the Kantian "categori-
cal imperative" sense of duty making a thing good simply be-
cause it 1b willed and therefore morally binding regardless
of any element of value or consequences. He recognizes, ne-
vertheless, the two-fold aspect in Kant's formalism which he
accepts as very fundamental for empirical morality. The first
aspect Is the implication of the universality of the good wil
which is that we ought to act always in a manner harmonious
with an ideal of what human society ought to be. The second
aspect is the principle of social justice which is that we
ought to Judge ourselves and others impartially. Realism
holds that if formalism is stripped from any consideration
of pragmatic consequences, it becomes an empty category of
existence. This is the substance of Wieman's criticism of
purely formal idealism in an article entitled, "Objectives
Versus Ideals". (1) "For the most part", he declares, "tradi-
tion and illusion have shaped all our living. ... The most po-
pular ideals about which we hear most talk, belong with the
illusions". This Is to say that we often will the ideal, but
in our daily experiences we either forget or ignore them. In
such case ideals truly become mere illusions, or formal empti-
ness. The inner motive of the will must find its objective
expression or pragmatic consistency in the realm of empirical
values as well as in the subjective realm of logical ideals.
The oragmatlc value of ideals, nevertheless, is recognized by
religious realists.
(l)H.N.Wieman; Int. Jr. Eth .. 35(1925), 296-307
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Boodin thinks that psychologically the will is re-
lated to the organism in the sense that it is the organization
of instincts and impulses focused through interest and dynam-
ically guided by intention toward a certain definite line of
activity. Ethically, on the other hand, the will is control-
led by reason and feeling which together make up a rational
or critical conscience. He says:
So far as the modes of will are concerned,
these can only be known as they unfold themselves
in its selective reactions. Each instinct reveals
a fundamental mode of will a theme which is organized
in ever greater complexity through its racial and
individual development. It becomes the will to sym-
pathize, the will to know, and so on through its va-
rying and complex motifs. If the will is dependent
upon a physical world and its contents for its real-
ization, it is in turn the reaction of the will which
makes meaning and value of life possible. (1)
4. Teleological utilitarianism: Element of purpose.
It follows that motivation is an Important element in value
experience or personal life. The reel problem is "What is
man purpose in life?" Or, what is man's objective? The will
without some reference to purposive Intentions or motives and
ends is without meaning. The will must, then, have inherent
and practical objectives, besides transcendental ideals. It
must have some real workable plan of realizable moral life,
or "some satisfaction which is maintained and may be increased
by those activities which we call living". To live humanly
is to engage in the purposive and progressive organization of
an ever more complex system of habits by which one reacts to
an ever larger portion of the world and its purposes. (2)
(1) J.E. Boodin; RU, 173-
(2) H.N.Wieman; Int. Jr. Eth . t 35(1925), 298.
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The world or the real universe is created for a pur*-
pose; such teleological nature of reality is the fundamental
revelation of "Cosmic Evolution". The world is not a mere
mechanism, as was shown in chapter one, but a world that has
a purposive mind directing and perfecting mechanical and spir-
itual laws. This is the "new teleology" which Implies that
there is creativity in the cosmic activity that transcends
mechanical processes in nature. (1) "Conduct is free only
when it is a consequence of a systematic purpose", says Bood-
in; and man's moral endeavor is the development of those forms
of conduct "by which he purposely and freely adjusts himself
to a great complexity of processes round about him and thus
fulfills the objectives of a more abundant life. Conduct is
moral, says. Rogers, Just in so far as it integrates the pur-
poses of the individual with the purposes of Ms group, and
ultimately with all mankind. (2)
Life's purpose or objective, then, according to
Wieman, is the progressive transformation of inner feelings,
desires and will into actual values orfpossibili ties of living.
This in substance is the teleological nature of moral experi-
ence. He holds that one of the main factors in the realiza-
tion of the "maximum energy" is finding a "life-purpose".
Wright, moreover, clearly states that:
«hen the activity of life are organized
under the sovereignty of one supreme devotion, each
activity supports the others, inner conflicts and
friction are removed, maximum stimulus is operative,
all habits pull together and distractions are ex-
cluded, and, if the purpose is of high sort,
(1) J.E.Boodin; RU, 368-378; 185-6.
(2) A. K.Rogers; TE, 117.
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cooperative adjustment to the environment is pro-
moted. (1)
This is, to empirical realism, the essential dynamic function
of religion in the attainment of a growing moral life, a pur-
posive and passionate devotion to the supreme source of in-
finite values, which is G-od.
5. Scientific Rationalism: Element of reason. By
far the most important aspect in value experience, according
to religious reallsmjis the element of reason or the scien-
tific attitude in the determination of what is good and vir-
tuous, and in the control of personal impulses, desires, and
purposes. In order to be ethical, the individual's feelings,
will and purposes must be rational. That seems to me to be
a truism; for the Interaction and integration of these feel-
ings and purposes in proper order imply definite type of con-
trol. This is rational control. Conduct, then, in order to
be moral must be consistent and harmonious with experience
and reality as a whole. "A rational decision in moral situ-
ation implies a coordination of all the instincts and emotions
involved ... .Reason itt morality is closely related to volition.
Each implies the coordination of impulses and sentiments in
response to the whole self. Spinoza thought of will and rea-
son, as identical; while for Kant the will is the practical
reason, i.e. reason in conduct". (2)
Doubtlessly, conflicts do arise in the feeling of
obligation, desire and purpose; reason must enter into the
experience as the harmonizer and synthecizer or discriminator
(1) H.N.Wieman; IL, 2-28; 85-100.
(2) W.K.Wright; G-IE, 270-2.
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of the objectives of moral judgments or conduct. Reason Is
the constant factor in the making of rational or critical
conscience, the counsellor of the will and the accountant of
desires. The voice of conscience, it seems to me, is ethical-
ly binding or imperative only when it implies reason or di-
vine revelation. For intuition is but a short cut process of
reason to truth, a mystical and vivid apprehension of truth
and reality. Experience without reason means a life of chaos
and devoid of real meaning and value. This is consistent with
the religious realistic attitude that "To live intelligently
in a world as complex and rapidly changing as ours, requires
that we constantly solve the problem of how to act in a new
situation in such a way as to achieve the best possibilities
of value which it may have to offer" .(1) In other words, the
"blind urge" of life, feelings, Intuitions, desireB and vivid
impulses must find intelligent interpretation and rational
control in conduct or in the "art of life",
G-. The Reasonableness of Christian Morality.
To crystalize the substance of this chapter we may
say that it has set forth the essential elements in the ethics
of religious realism that have direct bearing on the making
of moral experience and personal character. The system may
be characterized as realistic, objective and empirical in its
conception of value; and synthetic and rational in its ethical
principles. It is also idealistic in the sense that religious
realism recognizes the practical value of ideals and the prime
(l)H.N.Wieman; IL, 12.
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importance of the spiritual life. Hence, it may be said,
religious realism is consistent with Christian principles.
And from another point of view Christianity finds its ethical
Justification in the moral philosophy of realigious realism.
The supreme validity, value and importance of Chris-
tian morality, according to Macintosh in his book, The Rea-
sonableness of Crhlstianlty , lies in its essential character
of being rational and eminently practical and intelligible.
True morality, he explicitly declares, must be reasonable.
That is to say, it must have in it a rational ideal and ob-
jective, it must be conducive to freedom and empirically prac-
tical, it must lead to spiritual values individual and social.
Essential Christianity is reasonable and true because in its
structure and function it gives due provision for freedom and
aopeals to experience; and because its principles and ideals
are thoroughly spiritual and social; it is in full accord with
right Judgment and reason. (1) "In fact we are in a position
to say", he further declares, "that a morality that is truly
free, empirical, spiritual, and social is reasonable; and
since, as we have seen, essential Christianity in its morality
is free, empirical, spiritual, and social, we are entitled to
conclude that Christian morality is reasonable, universally
valid, and permanently true" .(2)
(1) D.fl. Macintosh; RC, 26-39
(2) Ibid, 39.
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CHAPTER V.
VIRTUOUS LIFE AND THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEM.
Moral experience has been reconsidered in the last
chapter in the light of the religious realistic ethics or the
theory of value and moral Judgment in relation to experience
and moral character. With regard to the nature of value we
noted among other things two essential aspects; first, its
objective reality both in its instrumental and intrinsic
forms; and second, its empirical realization in personal ex-
perience which Involved the consideration of instincts, im-
pulses, and sentiments in terms of individual and social need,
interest and satisfaction. And with regard to moral Judgment
we noted that religious realism holds to the synthetic system
in the determination of the highest good as the object of per-
sonal and social conduct. This involved the consideration of
social welfare, intuition, freedom, purpose and reason. Each
of these, together with their implications, contributes to the
right criterion of moral Judgment or the guide to moral ex-
perience. We also added, as an appendix to the chapter, that
Christian ethics stands the test of the highest degree of
reasonableness and practicality.
We are, in this chapter, concerned with the slgnifi-*
cance of religion in virtuous living. Morality has to do with
ideals of conduct, declares Macintosh, whereas religion in th
ordinary sense of the term has to do with man 1 s relation to
•
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to the Supreme Being. (1) To his way of thinking moral op-
timism is the highest level and possibility of human aspira-
tion; it is man's highest endeavor to conserve actual values
and ideals, and to readjust or integrate his life in accor-
dance with his ideals. But man as a finite being has his
limitations while his aspirations take flight beyond actual
human possibilities. For the satisfaction of these aspira-
tions, macintosh thinks, there must be also a spiritual or
religious optimism. Moral optimism is the preparation of the
soul for the reception of the higher and unrealized spiritual
values of divine creation. This is expressed in his concep-
tion of God as the necessary Implication of the moral life
and personal immortality:
If moral optimism is valid and there is
an attitude and adjustment on our vart which, when
fulfilled, Justifies freedom from anxiety about what
is beyond our power and brings an Inward or spiri-
tual preparedness for anything that can happen to us,
it logically follows that there must be among or a-
bove the powers at work in the world a Dependable
Factor, conserving all absolute spiritual values be-
yond what man as a physically embodied and limited
creature is able to do. This Power must be the ul-
timate power with which man has to do, the object of
absolute dependence, and must be great enough and
good enough favorable enough to human values to
effect for man what man Imperatively needs to have
done, if he is to be Justified in remaining a moral
optimist. (2)
This is in substance religious realism and its re-
lation to moral realism is expressed thus:
Conservation of the essential values of
the religious consciousness requires that the Ob-
ject of man's absolute worship and dependence be
regarded as the realization of ideal perfection,
(lfrD. D.Macintosh; RC, 40.
(2) Ibid, 75.

71
whereas conservation of the essential values of the
moral consciousness requires that the goal of ideal
perfection be regarded as still awaiting realization.
...The reality of the Ideal which religion demands
can "be found in the ideal character and will of God,
and the unfinished task, the unrealized ideal with-
out which there would be no validity in any moral
law, is found in the fact that the good will o£ Bod
is not yet fully realized, but is with the volun-
tary co-operation of men of good will, being pro-
gressively realized. (1)
From this it is to be noted, then, that true morality which
makes for human virtue must be essentially religious in or-
der for man to attain the greatest possible good in life.
Religion, therefore, is an essential factor in the moral or
virtuous life; for religion supplies the satisfactions of
man's aspiration for the "more-than-human" values, values
which only the divine can create and conserve.
A. Nature of Virtue: Relation to Value and Character.
Let us now for a moment turn to the consideration
of virtue as religious realism interprets it, and try to de-
termine its relation to moral character and the problem it
creates for religion.
All virtues are human values. V>lue and virtue re-
present two points of view. (2) Value in general is of the
objective relation of things and persona in the social envi-
ronment; while virtue is the established character of the be-
havior or conduct of the self in realizing that value. Value
belongs to the objective character of reality and virtue to
the subjective moral quality of the individual person.
A virtue, then^is a moral value in terms of personal
(1) Op.cit., 78-9.
(2) A. K.Rogers; TE, 160-176. W.K.Wright; (HE, 343-350.

72
V
§
•
integration or traits of man; it is a type of character re-
cognized as conducive to the interest of individual and soeia]
good, and capable of social approval. YVrlght conceives vir-
tue in terms of sentiments; while others such as Wieman inter-
prets it as an approved type of adjustment, or interaction.
In any case it serves the good life, the rational control of
tendencies, desires and will. "All virtues are sentiments",
declares Wright, "and imply an habitual organization of im-
pulses toward some object. Being sentiments, all virtues are
acquired, and none are innate. Virtues are never attained
without effort .... They all imply thoughtful recognition and
appraisal of personal traits". (1)
Sentiments may and often does become religious in
their attitudes; that is, individuals adjust their lives in
terms of their personal faith, beliefs, loyalties, aspirations
and ideals regarding God or the Supreme controller of the uni-
verse, and hence all personal virtues -** dedicated to this re-
ligious ideal. In his A Student's Philosophy of Religion
Wright declares clearly the significance of the religious
sentiment. He says:
A sentiment is an organization of instinc-
tive tendencies in response to a given object that
calls them into activity .... The various sentiments,
taken together, constitute the character of a man.
...The religious sentiment has for its primary ob-
ject, the Agency (God) through which the conserva-
tion of socially recognized values (or virtues) is
sought.... As conservation of the higher moral values
is sought through God, all the emotions and senti-
ments connected with them also unite with the re-
ligious sentiments. Among these would be included
(1)W. K.Wright; GIE, 221.
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the sentiments felt toward goodness, purity of
heart, wisdom, self-control, physical and moral
courage, Justice, and all the other virtues to
which one aspires. (1)
Personality, then, or the character of the individual self is
the synthesis of all the virtues; hence, the problem of moral-'
ity and religion is the progressive harmonization and coordi-
nation of all the sentiments into the unity of life. Religion,
according to religious realisnij of fers the adequate Object for
the most powerfull and unifying sentiment. This is God; and
Macintosh believes that this religious object must be taken
in terms of Ideal Personality. He declares:
What is meant is that the God of moral
optimism, however superpersonal he may possibly
be in some unknown and unimaginable sense, is most
reasonably thought of as at least personal in the
sense of being conscious, intelligent, purposive,
working consciously and rationally toward an end
in which the conservation of human personality and
values is included. Furthermore, such an essential-
ly personal God, working dependably for such an ide-
al end, always adequate for man's absolute depend-
ence and trust, must be regarded as completely mor-
al, perfect in holiness and in self-giving love. (2)
Belief in a personal God is k to Macintosh, an essential part
of or an implication in the reasonableness of moral and re-
ligious optimism; and such belief is consistent with the rea-
sonableness of "essential" Christianity.
B. The Objectivity and Classification of Virtues.
Wright believes that although human virtues or the
standards of virtue do change and develop through the process
of evolution, there are nevertheless certain intuitively per-
ceived objectives, permanent standards or cardinal virtues.
(1) W.K.Wright; SPR, 220-223.
(2) D. C.Macintosh; RC, 78.
••
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For as values have objective character so their corresponding
virtues also have their distinct objectivity in the character
and goodness of the Cosmic Consciousness and Will.(l) &nd to
follow the thought of Macintosh, absolute and -eternal virtues
are in reality in the personality of God. Each virtue is
theoretically autonomous and consistent with one another, and
in a sense they "overlap" or interpenetrate. "Perfect posses-
sion of any virtue would mean inclusion of all, in a complete-
ly unified and coherent personality"
.
(2)
Virtues may be classified according to Rogers in
terms of the rational demands of the intellect, the objectives
of the will, and the conditions of the social environment
. (3)
The formal demands of the intellect are the virtues of clear
thinking, with sincerity and vision; openmindedness; and a
sense of proportion with reasonable simplicity. The virtues
in terms of the inner will are loyalty to the rational ideal
and obligation; courage with self-control; and conscientious-
ness in the performance of tasks. The virtues in terms of the
social environment are business prudence or economy; Justice,
granting every man his due opportunity of self-development;
benevolence which calls for a righteous assistance to others
who are necessarily in need of such assistance, or Justice
plus love; and self-respect which call$ for the preservation
and development of personal dignity and worth, -i-he "Sumrnum
Bomum" is therefore, the rational cultivation and harmony of
all these distinct virtues in the making of personality
.
(4)
(1) W.K.Wright; G-IE, 224-5.
(2) Ibid, 225.
(3) A. K.Rogers; TE, 160-176.
(4) Compare with S.K.Wright; GIE, 225-248.
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Similarly, Wright sets forth the various cardinal
virtues and defines them showing their distinctions:
1. Moral courage: This is a firm attitude or
stand by what is believed to be right in the face of any dan-
ger or opposition without foolhardiness
.
2. Honor: This is the cultivation and pre-
servation of the dignity of personality with regard to social
respect.
3. Temperance: This is the rational control,
not denial, of impulses with respect to the satisfactions of
the self in relation to the good of society.
4. Justice: This is the rendering to every
one his due opoortunlty for aelf -development and for fulfil-
ling personal obligations.
5. Love or benevolence: This calls for ten-
derness, sympathy and comradeship with familv, neighbor and
to all mankind; to render them more than justice demands.
While Justice calls forth a passive attitude, love is an ac-
tive service.
6. Loyalty: This is love expressed with re-
ference to the social unit; the rational control of senti-
ments felt towards the social group to which one belongs or
to a social ideal such as country, patriotism, and God.
7. Economy: This is the rational control and
appropriation of property and wealth in the enrichment of
spiritual life individual and social.
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8. Wisdom: This Is the virtue of conscientious
and honest criticism and comparative appraisal of all values
as ends and means in the search for the greatest possible
goods.
9. Respect: This is a rational regard for the !
rights of personality, self and other selves,
10. Reverence: This is a personal respect
toward a Being superior to man, God "who arouses in him com-
plex emotions of admiration, awe, love, and gratitude, and
also probably, of mystic rapture and devoted loyalty".
C. The Significance and Function of Religion .
It is clearly apparent that the foregoing cardinal
virtues are consistent with the objectives of religion; they
are to my mind and Judgment essentially the objectives of
Christianity. Religion, says the religious realist, always
has a moral purpose. It seeks the realization of the highest
values through worship, communion and fellowship with God.
The values which religion endeavors to conserve coincide with
^with the highest moral values that are known, but much more
than mere moral values. (1) The function of religion, accord-
ing to realism, necessarily Involves moral values as shown
by Hre definition of the nature of religion:
Religion is the endeavor to secure the con-
servation of socially recognized values through spe-
cific actions that are believed to evoke some agen-
cy different from the ordinary ego of the individual,
or from other merely human beings, and that imply a
feeling of dependence upon this agency. (2)
(1) *. K.Wright; SPR, 54-5.
(2) Ibid, 47, 214.
i<
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This is Wright's definition, and there are three essential
'elements involved; First, the conservation of value. The
term conservation is used here to include also the production
it
and increase of values following the thought of Hoffding.(i)
Second, the worship of a superhuman power or agency which is
God. And third, man's absolute dependence on this divine
Power in the endeavor to conserve socially recognized values.
In the course of a man's religious experience, Wright declares
convincingly , "he gains these values and makes them a part of
his self, through what he believes to be a divine aid",(fc)
To follow further the train of Wright's realistic
thought, he claims that all religions contain the essential
elements of the defenition. In fact his survey of ancient
and comparative religions in his A Student's Philosophy of
Religion is painstakingly made to corroborate this view; he
finds, however, the highest and completest fulfillment in the
nature and function of the religion of Jesus. What Christi-
anity has endeavored to conserve are:
1. The ethical inwardness j which is the supreme
Christian value jwhich requires inner change of life and will,
or reconstructing the integration of personality into the
likeness of the personality of Jesus.
2. The purification of the home and the sexual
life, which demands spiritual interpretation of human and
institutional relationship.
3. The humanitarian attitude which places
CI) H, tio^amo; TKe?k;i OSg phv of 'RalLSim, t, %0<\-2-ll
(Jfc) Op.Clt., 214. Mac m\ Haw, It if .
4•
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emphasis on the virtue of love as the central core of the
principle of human brotherhood.
4. The principle of social Justice or the re-
cognition of free individuals and democratic institutions.
The essential function of Christianity, then, is "to set be-
fore men the matchless personality of Jesus Christ, a person-
ality from whom men may gain a fuller appreciation of moral
va]/es, and a reinforcement of their wills so that they may
be able to realize these values in their lives. (1)
In regard to the life of the Christian Church
Wright says:
The whole history of Christianity may be
Interpreted as a record of the different ways in
which men of different ages have worshipped God
through Christ, and so have learned to live on a
high spiritual level. To live on this level is the
experience which they have called an assurance of
salvation and redemption. ( 2)
In moral experience, moreover, or in the virtuous life the
religious object of worship and prayer has an internal rela-
tion with human consciousness or the self. (5) This is to say,
the voice of God speaks from within; and the character of God
or the Supreme Value of life is manifest, though finitely, in
human personality through religious experience. The infinite
that is beyond is within. "With the Inspiration of this im-
manent uod working within them, men are rapidly mastering the
harsh conditions of their physical environment, gradually
achieving mutual love and Justice in social organizations,
and slowly rising to finer heights of individual character
.
(A]
(1) Op.clt., 199-204.
(2) Ibid, 205.
(3) fcaKXKXtxx® Ibid, 388-390.
(4) loc.cit., 205.
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The most absorbingly interesting and humanly popular
presentation of religious realism in the course of my reading
is given by Wieman in his three volumes; namely, The Wrestle
of Religion with Truth
,
Religions Experience and Scientific
Method , and The Issues of Life * I can not hope to give a
very full treatment of these works here for obvious reasons.
To give a mere brief summary of them would not do fair Just-
ice to the stimulus and interest they evoke in me, and yet
with apology that is just what I propose to do.
Wieman interprets religion and the nature of G-od
from the impersonalistic point of view. God is personal in
the sense that it (1) or he posseses integrating powers such
as found in human personality. But, Wieman argues, God is
more than personal. God is defined in terms of the greatest
value in existence, or possibility:
But God is that order of existence and
possibility by virtue of which the greatest pos-
sible good is truly a possibility and can be a-
chieved by human effort. .. .Human can be S3©, effi-
cacious In bringing a desired possibility to t>aes
only when there is some order in which and with
which men can work to that end. All this applies
to the possibility of greatest value. .. .G-od is that
one order which sustains and mediates the possibi-
lities of greatest value. (2)
God, in other words, is the existent reality of the highest
order of value and not to be Identified with the subjective
consciousness of an ideal which is of human intellectual
construction. The nature of this divinity is essentially
Love; "this order of greatest value is the order of communi-
cation," a principle of interaction in adjustive behavior
(1) Wieman uses it or that interchangeably with he or
who with reference to God.
(2) H.N. Wieman; IL, 162.
*
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among human beings "in which each individual finds in all his
living the meaning and the value of the whole march of life".
Progressive integration interaction of values is the
manifest presence of God in life processes. (1) This order of
value and interaction may be conceived, as Wieman thinks, as
personality, for personality is an order of value; or it may
it
be taken as a system of values, in which case, is more than
personal. (2)
Religion or religious experience, therefore, is the
endeavor of man to seek God or to find "that order of exis-
tence and possibility which includes the possibilities of
greatest value", or to find that adjustment to God which will
yield the "maximum security and abundance to all human liv-
ing". (3) The heart of religious devotion is in the creativity
of worship, and Wieman' s characterization of worship is this:
The greatest creative enthusiasm of which
human life is capable can be awakened only when a
man gives his whole attention to the object which
is, in fsct, the condition of greatest enrichment
to all human living. Only as man exposes himself
to the full stimulus of this object can his utmost
capacity for response be awakened. This attitude
toward the most important object in the universe is
worship. And worship is the heart of religion.
From it arises the largest creative endeavor human-
ly possible. (4)
Let us now sum up the place of religion in the moral
life as interpreted by Wieman:
1. The art of religious living is the progres-
sive conservation and increase of moral values. This is not
merely gathering together the values or traditions of the past
(1) Op.cit., 176.
(2) Ibid, 137.
(3) H.N. Wieman; RESM, 381; IL, 169.
(4) RESM, 383.
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and present, "but an exploration into the beyond for the high-
est spiritual values not yet attained but possible of attain-
ment. Conservation is creative endeavor. "To be conservative
is to conserve the good which the oast has achieved. To be
progressive is to add to that good ... .Hence one must be con-
servative in otder to the progressive"
.
(1)
2. The organization of the totality of habits
under the dynamic control of the religious sentiment*. This
is the function of worship as means of successful living. It
requires in the first place, the exposure of the self to God
in confession, communion, and devotion; and in the second
place, the reconstruction of personal traits in accordance
with revealed ideals and objectives. (2)
3. 'The social and religious adjustment for
the greatest goodt This is the process of eliminating the
ills of life. "Religion has always claimed to be the pre-
ventive or cure.... It has stood as a preventive in the sense
that it has so equipped man that he could adjust himself to
situation in such a way as to escape the three-fold evils of
social wrongdoing, mental misery and Impoverishment of life".
This is regeneration and orientation. (3) Religion offers
salvation, the progressive fulfillment of the deepest spiri-
tual and moral needs of human nature which religious experi-
ence alone can attain.
4. The power of vision*. Perhaps the greatest
of all that religion accomplishes in human or virtuous living
(1) H.N.Wieman; WRT, 48.
(2) Ibid, 79.
{3) Ibid, 113.
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is the power of vision it gives to the worshipper. To this
"ieman expresses perhaps his own religious experience when
he says:
There is a "beauty which will glorify all the
ways of the world when we make those adjustments which
are required for maximum aesthetic appreciation and
artistic achievement. There is a measure of control
over all the forces of nature and over all the condi-
tions of human happiness which will "be ours as soon as
we make those scientific and other Intellectual adjust-
ments which are required. And there is an intellec-
tual comprehension of the magnificent sweeo of the in-
tricate universal process through time and space, which
is an added good to be attained through thj£inking, o-
ver and above that control of nature which science af-
fords. And there is a creative intercourse of minds,
a love, cooperation and mutual understanding, that will
yield unimaginable Joy when we make the required social
and moral ad Justments
.
( 1)
Such is Wieman's "apocalyptic" vision of the Kingdom of God,
or the highest order of ethical utooia or earthly heaven or
adjusted personalities through divine interaction and human
cooperation. This is the religious vision, and its power
over the human soul is expressed thus:
The religious man is stirred with this vi-
sion, is given assurance and peace by it, is inspired
by it to reconstruct our human way of living with res-
pect to personal habits, social organization and in-
tellectual, artistic, aesthetic and moral endeavors,
to the end of making those adjustments which will en-
able God to fill our lives with the good which may be
ours. This is the method of religion. (2)
Religion, then, is a process of reconstruction and readjust-
ment of the moral life, with the help and guidance of the
supernatural Power.
(1) Op.cit., 130-1.
(2) Op.cit., 131-2.
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SUMMARY
Thus we have followed the flight of moral experi-
ence into the field of religious realism. The journey has
been long, but in fair weather. Let us now review comprehen-
sively the scenes through which we have travelled with experi^
ence viewing the real world and the life within it through
the perspective insights of religious realists.
.Ve have seen that, as experience travels and opens
its eyes into the wide open world of metaphysical reality,
there is presented the real universe itself with a divine te-
leological character. From one point of view experience sees
the teleological integration between man and the cosmos; from
another point of view there is the recognition of the two dis-
tinct but related processes--the psychical and the physical;
and from a still another point of looking at reality, with a
keener vision and more analytic as well as poetic mind, the
universe presents itself with the divine five-fold truths such
as being, space, time, form, and consciousness. All of these
make up this one dynamic world of triadic realism, physical,
personal and divine realism. .Moreover, experience spies the
realm of essence, which is sometimes known as subsistence, in
which there is revealed the precipice of error and illusion.
Then, suddenly, experience becomes aware of itself
as consciousness, and as an integral part of the real world.
It finds on the earthly planet three cjief types of thought
regarding the nature of consciousness. One type is called
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subjectivism which finds in consciousness the only reality;
another type is called objectivism which finds that conscious
ness '•ought" to "be anplied to the observable behavior of the
natural and organic world without the necessity of postulat-
ing a mysterious psychic mind within and behind the real
physical universe. A third type is the mediating school
manifesting in critical realism and objective idealism, both
of which recognize more or less the reality of both conscious
ness or the realm of spirit and nature or the realm of matter
Among the critical realists there is the group of religious
realists who recognize the independent real existence of both
mind and matter. Religious realism is found to interpret
consciousness as a form of potential energy, as a universal
condition of personal life, and as a psychic process in terms
of the creative activity of the mind, finite and Cosmic.
Examining consciousness further, experience finds
that it is differentiated into individual selfes both finite
and divine; and this differentiation is brought about by the
complex integration and unified organization of psychophysical
organisms capable of internal and external adjustment to the
environment and to the cosmic universe. The Individual self
may be taken in terms of the "empirical me" or being in con-
duct; or In terms of the totality of personality including
both the waking consciousness and the unconscious mental or-
ganization of personal life. Experience, then, becomes cons-
cious of its own personality and its infinite possibilities
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through its dual nature--physlcal and mental--interacting
within itself for certain obvious personal ends.
Then as we follow experience in the search for
truth, we note that knowledge is an objective attainment
which contributes to the moral growth of personality. Ex-
perience finds in common sense the basis or the first step
toward real knowledge and truth; it Implies both the creati-
vity of mind and the objectivity of truth. This is to say
that truth is attained through subjective logical consistency
within the individual mind, and through the objective process
of finding in the real world the identity or correspondence
of inner experience. Having determined what constitutes re-
lative truth by way of reconstructive dualism and synthetic
monism, experience finds that the truth experience has prag-
matic and practical value. It provides the scientific atti-
tude in the realm of morals and religion. Only when critical,
scientific and experimental methods are applied that moral
and religious principles and beliefs find their validity and
truth.
Inspired by a glimpse of the truth, experience
raises its wings and explores the higher realms of values.
Exercising its intuitive powers, experience discovers that
values are objectively inherent in the real universe, and
that they are there awaiting to be realized or taken up into
meaningfull personal conduct. It also finds that these values
may be grouped into instrumental and intrinsic values; and
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that the ultimate intrinsic value is moral character includ-
ing intellectual, aesthetic and religious values. Character
values are realized through organic and personal integration,
individual and social; and also through taking into consider-
ation a system of moral judgment involving social welfare,
intuition, autonomy of the will, utilitarian purpose and
critical reason. Reflecting on Christianity for a moment,
experience learns that Christian ethics possesses the highest
degree of reasonableness and practicality.
Realizing the meaning and significance of moral
values in Itself and in the world, experience then proceeds
to apply them to Itself in the development of its character
or virtuous living. It explores and tests the ideal virtues
such as courage, honor, temperance, Justice, love, loyalty, £
economy, wisdom, respect and reverence; and finds them all
good in themselves and that the real virtuous life is attained
in the harmonious integration of all these ideals. To the
problem of how successfully to conserve, increase and inte-
grate harmoniously these virtues, experience finds solution
and guidance through worship and religious experience or
cosmic aspiration. Experience finds in religion the most
dynamic and creative integrating power. This lies in the
nature of God, is essentially Love and the Supreme Good.
A
f
87
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Boodin, J. E.
Truth and Reality ,
New York: Macmillan, 1911.
A Realistic Universe*
New York: Macmillan, 1916.
Cosmic Evolution.
New York: Macmillan, 1925.
Macintosh, D.
The Reasonableness of Christianity.
New York: Scribner, 1925.
The Problem of Knowledge .
New York: Macmillan, 1915.
!.
ry Idea of God , J .F.Newton( ed
.
) , 135-15&.
boston: Little Brown, 1926.
The Pilgrimage of Faith in the World of
Modern Thought.
Calcutta: Calcutta Univ. Press., 1931.
Religious Realism.
New York: Macmillan, 1931.
Montague, ?/m. P.
The 7/ays of Knowing .
New York: Macmillan, 1925.
Belief Unbound .
New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1931.
Essays.... In Honor of William James
,
103-134.
(Sjeu) York ". Lo Ag^iins, Gceert,
Pratt, J. B.
Matter and spirit .
New York: Macmillan, 1922.
Adventures in Philosophy and Religion.
New York: Macmillan, 1931.
What Is Pragmatism?
New York: Macmillan, |^o^
The Religious Consciousness .
New York: Macmillan, 1920.
TR
RU
CE
RC
PK
MIG
PF
RR
WK
BU
E-WJ
MS
APR
WIP
RC

88
Rogers, A. K.
What Is truth?
New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1923.
The Religious Conception of the World .
New York: Macmillan, 1907.
~
The Theory of Ethics .
New York: Macmillan, 1922.
"Principles of Moral Legislation".
Int. Jr. Eth
. , 29(1919), 466-480.
"Conscience"
.
Int. Jr. Eth.
, 41(1931), 143-165.
"Feeling and the M ral Judgment".
Int. Jr. Ethics
, 40(1929), 15-38.
"Principles of Ethics".
Phil. Rev
., 30(1921), 24-40.
Wieman, H. N.
The Wrestle of Religion with Truth .
New York: Macmillan, 1927.
Religious Experience and Scientific Method
New York: Macmillan, 1927.
Methods of Private Religious Living.
New York: Macmillan, 1929.
"Objectives Versus Ideals".
Int. Jr. Eth .. 35(1925), 296-307.
Wright, W. K.
A Student's Phllosphy of Religion .
New York: Macmillan, 1922.
General Introduction to Ethics .
New York: Macmillan, 1929.
"Objectivity of Moral Judgments".
Int. Jr. Eth
., 37(1927), 147-157.
WT
RCW
TE
WRT
RESM
MPRL
SPR
GIE


i

<€


